Comparison of Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute and Matched Filtering Techniques for Device Discrimination and Operation Identification by Stone, Barron D.
Air Force Institute of Technology
AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works
3-24-2016
Comparison of Radio Frequency Distinct Native
Attribute and Matched Filtering Techniques for
Device Discrimination and Operation
Identification
Barron D. Stone
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stone, Barron D., "Comparison of Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute and Matched Filtering Techniques for Device
Discrimination and Operation Identification" (2016). Theses and Dissertations. 323.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/323
COMPARISON OF RADIO FREQUENCY
DISTINCT NATIVE ATTRIBUTE AND
MATCHED FILTERING TECHNIQUES FOR
DEVICE DISCRIMINATION AND
OPERATION IDENTIFICATION
THESIS
Barron D. Stone, 1st Lt, USAF
AFIT-ENG-MS-16-M-048
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, the United States Department
of Defense or the United States Government. This material is declared a work of the
U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.
AFIT-ENG-MS-16-M-048
COMPARISON OF RADIO FREQUENCY DISTINCT NATIVE ATTRIBUTE
AND MATCHED FILTERING TECHNIQUES FOR DEVICE DISCRIMINATION
AND OPERATION IDENTIFICATION
THESIS
Presented to the Faculty
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
Air Education and Training Command
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science in Electrical Engineering
Barron D. Stone, B.S.E.E.
1st Lt, USAF
March 2016
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
AFIT-ENG-MS-16-M-048
COMPARISON OF RADIO FREQUENCY DISTINCT NATIVE ATTRIBUTE
AND MATCHED FILTERING TECHNIQUES FOR DEVICE DISCRIMINATION
AND OPERATION IDENTIFICATION
THESIS
Barron D. Stone, B.S.E.E.
1st Lt, USAF
Committee Membership:
Maj Samuel J. Stone, PhD
Chair
Capt Timothy J. Carbino, PhD
Member
Dr. Michael A. Temple
Member
AFIT-ENG-MS-16-M-048
Abstract
The research presented here provides a comparison of classification, verification,
and computational time for three techniques used to analyze Unintentional Radio-
Frequency (RF) Emissions (URE) from semiconductor devices for the purposes of
device discrimination and operation identification. URE from ten MSP430F5529
16-bit microcontrollers were analyzed using: 1) RF Distinct Native Attribute (RF-
DNA) fingerprints paired with Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood
(MDA/ML) classification, 2) RF-DNA fingerprints paired with Generalized Relevance
Learning Vector Quantized-Improved (GRLVQI) classification, and 3) Time Domain
(TD) signals paired with matched filtering. These techniques were considered for
potential applications to detect counterfeit/Trojan hardware infiltrating supply chains
and to defend against cyber attacks by monitoring executed operations of embedded
systems in critical Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks.
RF-DNA with MDA/ML achieved the best device classification performance at
high analysis Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNRA) among NDevAuth = 8 “authorized” de-
vices with average percent correct classification of %CAve ≥ 75.38% achieved for
SNRA ≥ 20 dB. RF-DNA with GRLVQI performed second best with %CAve ≥
60.85% achieved for SNRA ≥ 20 dB. Matched filtering yielded the lowest perfor-
mance of %CAve ≥ 52.38% achieved for SNRA ≥ 20 dB. The performance for opera-
tion classification among NOp = 12 register-to-register operations was lower than the
device classification performance and included 1) RF-DNA with MDA/ML achieving
%CAve ≥ 10.73% for SNRA ≥ 20 dB, 2) RF-DNA with GRLVQI achieving %CAve ≥
8.62% for SNRA ≥ 20 dB, and 3) matched filtering achieving %CAve ≥ 11.09% for
SNRA ≥ 20 dB.
iv
For device ID verification with NDevAuth = 8 “authentic” and NDevRogue = 2
“rogue” devices, both RF-DNA with MDA/ML and matched filtering techniques
successfully verified/rejected at least one authentic/rogue device using an Equal Error
Rate (EER) benchmark of EER ≤ 10% at SNRA = 30 dB. RF-DNA with GRLVQI
did not meet the benchmark in any evaluated verification scenarios.
When comparing the computational time required to process and classify collected
emissions, both RF-DNA techniques took roughly 3 times longer for device classifica-
tion and 42 times longer for operation identification compared to matched filtering.
v
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COMPARISON OF RADIO FREQUENCY DISTINCT NATIVE ATTRIBUTE
AND MATCHED FILTERING TECHNIQUES FOR DEVICE DISCRIMINATION
AND OPERATION IDENTIFICATION
I. Introduction
This chapter introduces the research topic and outlines the motivation for inves-
tigating Radio-Frequency (RF) Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) and matched
filtering techniques for device discrimination and operation identification. Section 1.1
provides a brief overview of the operational motivation for this research and is di-
vided into two subsections: 1) Section 1.1.1 describes hardware-based security con-
cerns and 2) Section 1.1.2 describes the threat of software-based vulnerabilities.
Section 1.2 gives a brief overview of existing research and technologies being lever-
aged by the current research effort. Section 1.3 summarizes how this research effort
relates and contributes to the existing research and technologies.
1.1 Operational Motivation
The proliferation of computing technology in recent decades has led to an in-
creased vulnerability to cyber attack in both the private and government sectors.
The United States Air Force (USAF) and Department Of Defense (DOD) have be-
come critically dependent on computer hardware and software to carry out nearly
every aspect of daily operations. Their digital systems range in size from globally
networked Information Technology (IT) resources that manage email and databases
to the tiny Integrated Circuit (IC) chips embedded in the Common Access Card
(CAC) issued to every DOD employee [51]. While there are many advantages to
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using these digital systems, they come with the cost of an increased vulnerability
to malicious cyber attacks. The USAF initially responded to the increase in cyber
vulnerability by establishing the Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team
(AFCERT) as the primary agency responsible for protecting USAF network assets
from attack. The monitoring efforts of AFCERT highlighted the magnitude of the
cyber threats facing military IT networks, reporting over 150 verified incidents of
“hackers” gaining access to USAF information systems in 2011 and nearly 2 million
weekly alerts indicating potential cyber attacks against USAF bases [122].
These cyber attacks are not limited to just military and DOD organizations.
From 2006 to 2012, the number of cyber incidents reported by federal agencies to
the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) increased
by 782 percent with improper usage, malicious code, and unauthorized access be-
ing the most widely reported types of incidents across the federal government [126].
With these findings came increased concern to protect national infrastructures which
have become increasingly reliant on computerized systems and electronic data for
their operation. A significant challenge to defending these infrastructures is that
they are largely owned by private sector organizations and many of the systems
performing key functions are proprietary in nature [126]. President Obama responded
to the concern in 2013 by issuing Executive Order 13636 with the goal of “improv-
ing critical infrastructure cybersecruity” [84].
The following sections describe the types of the hardware and software vulnera-
bilities that threaten the computerized Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems that are at the heart of critical infrastructures and military ap-
plications.
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1.1.1 Hardware Vulnerabilities.
The desire for cheaper electronic components has driven most IC manufacturers
to outsource the fabrication of semiconductor devices to countries with a lower cost
of labor such as China and Taiwan [1]. U.S. companies first moved their assembly,
testing, and packing operation to Asia in the 1960s. Later, in the 1980s, they began
shifting their fabrication abroad as well to produce semiconductor wafers from de-
signs created in the United States [130]. This growing reliance on foreign suppliers
has raised concern regarding the authenticity of hardware devices used in critical
infrastructure applications as well as military defense systems [106]. Counterfeit
hardware has been discovered in systems ranging from common network routers to
high-altitude missile computers [40]. The incidents of counterfeit electronic parts
encountered by original component manufacturers more than doubled between 2005
and 2008 [17] and reports of counterfeit parts saw a four fold increase from 2009
to 2011 [54]. The presence of counterfeit hardware in the supply chain is a serious
threat to the reliability of systems performing critical functions [106].
In addition to propagating unreliable counterfeit electronics, the outsourcing of
microchip production to foreign countries also presents the opportunity for mali-
cious hardware Trojans to be implanted in devices [85]. Complex supply chains like
that of the aerospace sector depend on an extensive network of purchasers, subcon-
tractors, suppliers, and partners which create many potential entry points for over-
seas fabrication facilities to embed unauthorized designs into devices at early stages
in the supply chain [130]. Current IC verification practices focus on testing chips
to meet a functional specification. While this approach may detect if certain func-
tionality was removed from the design it will likely fail to detect additional covert
functionality inserted by an adversary [7].
The ability to identify and authenticate semiconductor devices is important
3
to prevent counterfeit components and hardware Trojans from entering the sup-
ply chain for critical systems. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) recently initiated the “TRUST in Integrated Circuits” program to de-
velop technologies capable of verifying the contents of semiconductor components
used in military systems that were designed and fabricated under untrusted con-
dition. The TRUST program is pursuing a metrics based approach, formulated in
terms of probability of detection versus probability of false alarm, to identify mali-
ciously altered ICs [9].
This research effort focused on microprocessor ICs which were the second most
counterfeited semiconductor device in 2011 as shown in Table 1, accounting for
13.4% of reported incidents [55]. IC manufacturing processes operate within tol-
erances which allow for small physical variations between individual devices so that
no two devices are exactly the same. Those variations can impact the RF energy
emitted by devices during operation [14]. The device discrimination aspect of this
research leveraged those variations in Unintentional RF Emissions (URE) to pro-
vide a means of discriminating between individual MicroController Unit (MCU)
devices that could be applied to detect the presence of counterfeit or unauthorized
Trojan hardware.
Table 1. Top-5 most counterfeited semiconductors in 2011 (percentage of counterfeit
part reports) [55].
Rank
Commodity
Type
% of Reported
Incidents
#1 Analog IC 25.2%
#2 Microprocessor IC 13.4%
#3 Memory IC 13.1%
#4 Programmable Logic IC 8.3%
#5 Transistor 7.6%
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1.1.2 Software Vulnerabilities.
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are at the core of the SCADA sys-
tems that control critical functions in military and civilian infrastructures. They
are purpose-built machines which are often proprietary in nature and commer-
cially available as Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) hardware. In recent years,
as SCADA networks have grown in complexity and become connected to the open
Internet, it has raised security concerns regarding their increased vulnerability to
remote cyber attack. In 2011, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Cyber Se-
curity division revealed that hackers had successfully accessed SCADA systems con-
trolling the infrastructure of three unnamed cities [50]. With that sort of access,
malicious hackers could cause significant damage to sewage, power, and water facili-
ties.
One of the most publicized cyber attacks on a SCADA system was the Stuxnet
virus which infected the PLCs used to control Iranian nuclear centrifuges [44]. Stuxnet
was significant because it was the first cyberweapon created and deployed to cause
physical damage with the intent of degrading, disrupting, and destroying a specific
information system [35]; however, several other Stuxnet related viruses have since
been discovered including Duqu [18,111], Flame [19], and Shamoon [76]. In January
2015, hackers manipulated the control systems at a German steel mill to cause mas-
sive damage when a blast furnace could not be properly shut down - the second cy-
ber attack to cause physical damage [132]. Later that year, a cyber attack using the
BlackEnergy Trojan targeted the Ukrainian electric power industry leaving around
700,000 homes in the Ivano-Frankivsk region without power for several hours [75].
The Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Readiness Team (ICS-CERT),
which operates side-by-side with US-CERT, was aware of the BlackEnergy Trojan’s
capability to infect SCADA systems as early as 2014 [53].
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Modern worms and viruses that infect SCADA systems, including Stuxnet, may
hide their existence by reporting false status to the operator while performing ne-
farious deeds [131]. Stuxnet also took advantage of several previously unknown
“zero-day” vulnerabilities which would likely not have been detected by traditional
antivirus techniques which depend on previously known “virus definitions” [112].
The 7-layer Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) model shown in Figure 1 is used
to describe the different levels of a networked computer systems [113]. Modern
methods for detecting unauthorized activity on informations systems focus on ana-
lyzing data within the Application (level 1) and Network (level 5) layers of the OSI
model for anomalous program behavior. The execution of that analysis requires ad-
ditional processing resources beyond normal operation. The embedded MCUs used
in PLCs tend to have limited processing resources which prevent them from run-
ning onboard cybersecurity processes such as antivirus or intrusion detection [102].
Additionally, SCADA systems are often out-dated by IT standards, being deployed
for decades in easily accessible locations with poor physical security where they can
be easily tampered with and altered [32].
Attackers are constantly finding new ways to conceal their malicious code from
traditional detection methods which typically operate at the Network (level 5) layer
and above on the OSI model [97]. Therefore, it is necessary to develop efficient and
effective methods of detecting anomalous system behavior to prevent compromised
programming or zero-day attacks from entering critical infrastructure or military
combat systems [7]. The operation identification aspect of this research aims to
reverse-engineer the instructions executed on a MCU as a method of passively mon-
itoring a device to validate that it is functioning as expected. These types of moni-
toring systems are often implemented using low-cost hardware with limited process-
ing power which necessitate a simple algorithm with a low computational cost.
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Figure 1. OSI 7-layer network model [113].
1.2 Technical Motivation
This section provides a brief overview of the technical motivations and methods
utilized in this research effort.
1.2.1 RF Emission Exploitation.
For decades, it has been known that Electro-Magnetic (EM) emissions can con-
tain exploitable information about system operations. Declassified TEMPEST doc-
uments revealed that in the 1960s the United States was aware that cryptographic
systems were vulnerable to EM analysis and the Soviets had guidelines regarding
RF interference indicating that they also recognized the threat of exploitation [10].
The field of Side Channel Analysis (SCA) aims to extract information from unin-
tended sources to gain insight into the operation and nature of a device. In 1996,
Paul C. Kocher presented the first SCA attack which used information about the
execution time of a MCU-based RSA algorithm implementation to extract the pri-
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vate cryptographic key [69]. A few years later, Kocher presented a method of Dif-
ferential Power Analysis (DPA) which analyzed power consumption measurements
to extract secret keys from “tamper resistant” devices [70]. These groundbreaking
publications paved the way for many new exploitation techniques ranging from vi-
sual analysis to statistical models.
This research effort exploited the URE that are produced by all electronic de-
vices during their operation. One benefit of using URE attributes to classify devices
is that they based on physical characteristics of a device and are therefore difficult
to spoof. A large body of prior research has successfully demonstrated the ability
to detect and classify devices [11, 14–16, 20–22, 24, 27, 29–31, 34, 46, 49, 91, 93, 101,
102, 125, 127] and device operations [100–105, 127–129] based on RF attributes us-
ing a variety of methods. This research utilized a non-contact, near-field RF probe
to acquire URE from a Device Under Test (DUT) during its operation, providing a
non-destructive collection method that does not require the IC to be removed and
limits interference from other system components. For each of the three considered
classification methods, classifier models were first developed using a set of “train-
ing” emissions corresponding to each of the authorized device or operation classes.
Afterwards, the performance of each classifier model was evaluated using a second,
independent set of “testing” emissions.
1.2.2 RF-DNA Fingerprints and Classifiers.
The RF-DNA process captures, analyzes, and quantifies the variance in RF
emissions related to physical variances in manufactured semiconductor devices [14]
and/or different device operations [102]. Statistical features are extracted from an
observed RF emission to construct a collection of values called the RF “fingerprint”
which is associated with a specific device or operation. RF fingerprints can be used
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with a variety of classification methods to identify the source device or operation
corresponding to an observed RF emission. This research considered two classifica-
tion methods that have been utilized in previous RF-DNA research: Multiple Dis-
criminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) [14–16,26,29,67,68,91–93,109,
110, 124, 125, 127] and Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantized-Improved
(GRLVQI) [26, 67, 68, 90–93,102, 127]. Both methods have been successfully used for
device classification and verification; however, this research effort extends their use
to also classify executed operations.
1.2.3 Correlation and Matched Filtering.
The implementation of MDA/ML and GRLVQI classification methods used in
previous RF-DNA research, while effective, can become computationally expensive
for a large number of classes and/or RF-DNA fingerprint characteristics. The high
complexity of classification can prevent these processes from being implemented
on information systems with limited processing capabilities or power constraints,
such as mobile or embedded platforms [102]. While work continues to quantify and
reduce the computational complexity of classification processes [6, 59], this research
effort evaluated the viability of using relatively simple correlation-based matched
filtering for classification as an alternative to computationally complex algorithms
like MDA/ML and GRLVQI. Correlation is well suited to implementation in real-
time, inexpensive hardware because it is a conceptually straight forward function
with a well-defined computational complexity [102].
Matched filtering implemented with correlation is commonly used for symbol
estimation in digital communication systems due to its optimal performance as
a receiver in the presence of noise [89, 99]. Correlation is also used in other fields
such as image processing which required signals to be identified in noisy environ-
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ments [28]. Prior research at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) has
analyzed URE with Correlation-Based Anomaly Detection (CBAD) techniques to
detect anomalous software execution in PLCs [102, 103, 105] and MCUs [128, 129].
This research effort continued the investigation of correlation-based techniques and
matched filtering by aiming to identify the individual operations that are executed
by a MCU as well as discriminate between multiple, similar MCU devices.
1.2.4 Device and Operation Classification.
Classification performs a one-to-many comparison to classify an observed RF
emission as belonging to one of NC known classes. In the case of device discrimi-
nation the known classes correspond to authorized devices. For operation identifi-
cation the classes represent possible executed operations. This research evaluated
the classification performance of three methods to classify RF emissions as one of
NC = NDevAuth = 8 authorized devices or NC = NOp = 12 possible operations.
1.2.5 Device ID Verification.
Verification performs a one-to-one comparison of an unknown RF emission to
a specific known device with the goal of determining if the unknown emission orig-
inated from the claimed device. The verification process can be used to verify a
device’s bit-level identity to grant it system access. This process parallels proce-
dures for biometric human ID verification, such as using a photo ID card to verify
a person’s identity before granting them access [102]. This research evaluated the
verification performance when presenting each of NDevAuth = 8 authorized devices
and NDevRogue = 2 unauthorized “rogue” devices for verification claiming one of
the authorized identities. A verification assessment for “rogue operations” was not
performed because a MCU can only execute operations from a known, finite set.
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1.3 Research Contributions
The research goal involved comparing the effectiveness and computational costs
of three different techniques to classify URE: 1) MDA/ML with RF fingerprints,
2) GRLVQI with RF fingerprints, and 3) matched filtering with time domain emis-
sions. The three techniques were evaluated for both the task of discriminating be-
tween multiple MCU devices and identifying the operations executed on a device.
As summarized in Table 2, AFIT research contributions in the RF INTelligence
(RFINT) field have been made in several technical areas. Previously undefined
acronyms that are used in the table include: Time Domain (TD), Spectral Domain
(SD), Correlation Domain (CD), Intentional RF Emissions (IRE), Learning From
Signals (LFS), and Matched Filtering (MF).
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Table 2. Relational mapping between RFINT Technical Areas in Previous related
work and Current AFIT research contributions. The × symbol denotes specific areas
addressed.
Technical Area Previous Work Current Research
Addressed Ref # Addressed Ref #
TD Features × [67, 68,90–92,102–105] × [100,101]
[109,110,124,125,127–129]
SD Features × [15, 16,93,125]
CD Features × [102–105,109,110,128,129] × [100,101]
Emission Type
Intentional (IRE) × [29, 46,47,49,67,68,90]
[92,93,109,110,124,125]
Unintentional (URE) × [14–16,25,26] × [100,101]
[102–105,127–129]
Burst × [29, 46,47,49,67,68,90]
[92,93,109,110,124,125]
Continuous × [14–16,102–105,127–129] × [100,101]
High SNR × [29, 46,47,49,67,68,90]
[92,93,109,110,124,125]
Low SNR × [14–16,102–105,127–129] × [100,101]
Classification/Verification Processes
MDA/ML × [14–16,26,29,67,68,91–93] × [101]
[109,110,124,125,127]
GRLVQI × [26, 67,68,90–93,102,127] ×
LFS × [46–49]
MF × [100,101]
Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA)
MDA/ML × [47, 67,68,91–93,127]
GRLVQI × [66, 90–93,102,127]
LFS × [46–49]
Verification
Electronic Components × [14–16,102,127] × [101]
Wireless Devices × [29, 91–93]
Device Operations × [102–105,127–129] × [100,101]
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1.4 Document Organization
The remaining chapters are organized as follows. Chapter II provides back-
ground information regarding sources of RF emissions, detecting counterfeit and
Trojan devices, reverse engineering and validating device operations, the MSP430
DUT, MDA/ML, GRLVQI, and correlation-based classification methods. Chap-
ter III provides details on the methodology used for this research effort including
the DUT operating conditions, RF signal collection, post collection processing, clas-
sifier model development, and the procedures for evaluating classification, verifica-
tion, and computational time. Chapter IV presents the results of the methodolo-
gies from Chapter III including device classification, operation classification, device
ID verification, and computational time. Chapter V provides a summary of the re-
search results and recommendations for potential future research efforts.
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II. Background
This chapter provides background information on topics associated with this re-
search effort. Section 2.1 provides information about sources of Radio-Frequency
(RF) emissions and factors that can cause variations in emissions between devices
and executed operations. Section 2.2 covers the applications and techniques pur-
sued by prior related research efforts evaluating unintentional device emissions.
Details about the MSP430 MicroController Unit (MCU), which was used as the
Device Under Test (DUT) for this research effort, are cover in Section 2.3. Back-
ground information and justification for the signal collection techniques used in
this research are provided in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 provides background on meth-
ods used to classify RF Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprints and Sec-
tion 2.6 describes the correlation-based classification process used with Time Do-
main (TD) signals.
2.1 RF Emissions
The field of Side Channel Analysis (SCA) aims to extract information about a
device from unintended observable phenomena that are correlated with its inter-
nal state and operation. Commonly exploited side channels include variations in
computational time, power consumption, acoustic, RF, and optical emissions [80].
This research focused specifically on exploiting the RF energy that is radiated by
all electronic devices.
2.1.1 Intentional and Unintentional Emissions.
The Electro-Magnetic (EM) emissions produced by electronic devices can be
separated into two broad categories: intentional and unintentional [2]. The term
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Intentional RF Emissions (IRE) describes RF energy that is intentionally broadcast
by devices such as wireless radios, cellular phones, and IEEE 802.15 Bluetooth de-
vices as part of their primary function [102]. In addition to serving their purpose
to transmit wireless information, IRE can also leak secondary information about
the identity and operating conditions of the device. Prior RF-DNA research efforts
analyzed IRE to improve network security for several wireless communication stan-
dards including IEEE 802.11 WiFi [46, 47, 67, 68, 109, 110], IEEE 802.15 ZigBee [29],
and IEEE 802.16 WiMAX [49,90,93,124,125].
In addition to the RF energy that wireless communication devices intentionally
broadcast, all modern semiconductor devices also unintentionally broadcast RF en-
ergy due to electronic and EM field coupling between components. Operations such
as transistors switching on and off cause current fluctuations within semiconduc-
tor devices which produce Unintentional RF Emissions (URE) through three types
of coupling: conductive, inductive, and radiative [80]. When a physical conductive
path carries a signal through a system, conductive coupling produces faint currents
on all conductive surfaces or lines attached to the system. These conductive em-
anations often ride on top of strong, intentional currents within the same conduc-
tors [2] and can be observed in the power supply, ground line, and cables attached
to the device [10]. Inductive coupling occurs when two conductive paths are sepa-
rated by less than a wavelength and the current flowing through one wire induces
a voltage in the neighboring wire. When two circuit components are separated by
more than a wavelength, radiative coupling can cause parts of the circuit to act as
an antenna that transmits undesired RF waves which interfere with the other cir-
cuit components [86]. The URE that escape the device package can be observed
externally using a near-field RF probe as illustrated by Figure 2 which shows the
normalized RF spectral intensity observed across the surface of a MSP430 chip.
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Figure 2. Normalized RF spectral intensity of URE measured at 100×100 locations
spanning the surface of an MSP430F5529 chip package.
IRE and URE are both targets for SCA because they can carry potentially com-
promising information; however, the differences between URE and IRE require dif-
fering approaches for exploitation. IRE are based on wireless broadcast standards
that have a well defined signal structure and are typically transmitted at a high sig-
nal power which can be received by a “distant” antenna. URE, on the other hand,
do not have a specifically designed signal structure and are emitted at a signifi-
cantly lower signal power than IRE signals. The acquisition of URE requires an
RF probe and collection details, such as bandwidth and target frequency, are typ-
ically developed based on knowledge of device characteristics (clock rate, feature
size, etc...) and observation of captured RF signals [102]. Prior Air Force Insti-
tute of Technology (AFIT) research efforts have analyzed URE from a variety of
devices such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) [25, 26, 102–105, 127] and
MCUs [14–16,100,101,128,129].
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2.1.2 Variations Between Devices.
The unintentional RF energy that all electronic devices radiate as part of their
normal operation is characteristic of their function, design, and construction. Ad-
ditionally, the Integrated Circuit (IC) fabrication process introduces very small
scale (deep sub-micron in modern IC technology) variations in the final structure
of devices. As long as those variations are within acceptable tolerances the device
will be functionally correct; however, like snowflakes or human fingerprints, no two
chips are exactly alike. The tiny structural variants that make integrated circuits
unique also color the inherent URE in a manner that can be exploited to identify
the source device [15]. As demonstrated by previous RF-DNA research, even two
“same model” devices can be differentiated from each other based on their URE
with a high degree of accuracy [14–16,102].
2.1.3 Variations Due to Operation.
In addition to the impact of physical and electrical device characteristics on
URE, the operations and data being processed by digital hardware will also influ-
ence emissions [2]. Prior research to perform side-channel based reverse engineering
of PIC16F687 MCUs evaluated the effects that clock rate, working register, fetch-
ing process, bus data, processed data, opcode, instruction register, and noise had
on device power consumption as measured using a shunt resistor between the chip’s
GrouND (GND) and power supply. The research considered two simplistic models
to relate the device’s power consumption to the opcode and data being processed:
Hamming-Weight and Hamming-Distance [39].
The Hamming-Weight model assumes that power consumption is proportional
to the number of bits set in a chosen intermediate value, such as the opcode or
operand data. The observed power consumption can then be used to estimate the
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Figure 3. Averaged traces demonstrating the effects on power consumption caused
by Hamming weight of the current opcode in a PIC16F687 MCU [39].
Hamming weight of the intermediate value. Figure 3 shows that the Hamming
weight of the opcode has a characteristic impact on the power consumption in the
second and fourth clock cycles of PIC16F687 operation execution [39].
The Hamming-Distance model takes into account the number of altering opcode
and/or data bits between consecutive operations. This model is generally more ac-
curate than Hamming-Weight; however, it is more complicated to apply in practice
because both the previous and current values need to be known. Figure 3 shows
that the Hamming distance between consecutive opcodes has a characteristic im-
pact on the power consumption in the fourth clock cycles of PIC16F687 operation
execution [39].
The current research effort built on the previous power analysis based efforts to
determine if factors such as Hamming weight and Hamming distance of data and
opcodes also influenced URE in a useful way that could enable operation classifica-
tion. Initial experiments analyzing URE from the MSP430F5529 MCU showed that
there were visibly discernible differences in the TD waveforms for certain operations
related to the Hamming weight of the input operands and result value. One such
experiment executed one of three operations (AND.B, MOV.B, and XOR.B) after load-
ing the SouRCe (SRC) and DeSTination (DST) registers with one of seven values
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Figure 4. Averaged traces demonstrating the effects on power consumption caused
by the Hamming distance of the current and previous opcode in a PIC16F687 MCU.
Each trace was generated by first executing a MOVLW 0x55h instruction followed by
another MOVLW with the operand either being 0x55h, 0x5Ah, or 0xAAh [39].
having various Hamming weights. Since the SRC and DST registers were initialized
to the same value in each case, the result values stored back into the DST register
for the AND.B and MOV.B operation would be the same as the initial value that was
already in the DST register. Figure 5 shows that the averaged TD waveform peaks
of observed URE corresponding to the AND.B and MOV.B operations were closely
grouped and intermixed in amplitude with negligible impact from the differing ini-
tialization values [100].
Since XOR.B stores the XOR’d value of the SRC and DST operands into the
DST register (SRC ⊕ DST → DST) the result value being stored back into DST
would be different from the initialization value in each case. Figure 5 shows that
the averaged TD waveform peaks of observed URE corresponding to the XOR.B
operation were visibly separated in amplitude and grouped according to operand
Hamming weight. Additional early experiments also showed that it was possible to
estimate the executed instruction or to estimate the SRC and DST registers from
URE with better accuracy than “random guess” [100].
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Figure 5. Expanded view of averaged TD waveform peaks of URE collected from an
MSP430F5529 executing one of three operations. SRC (R4) and DST (R5) registers
were loaded with the listed values prior to execution. Traces for AND.B and MOV.B are
closely grouped because the input/result values are the same; however, traces for
XOR.B are visibly separated according to input/result Hamming distance [100].
2.2 Applications
The following sections provide an overview of prior efforts focused on device
authentication to detect counterfeit/Trojan hardware and operation validation
through the reverse engineering of executed instructions.
2.2.1 Counterfeit and Trojan Hardware Detection.
The term “counterfeit hardware” can be applied to a wide range devices includ-
ing cloned parts, mismarked parts, recycled parts from aged/reclaimed e-waste,
and parts that have been intentionally modified for malicious purposes (hacking,
theft, espionage). Devices that have been modified to contain malicious “Trojan”
circuitry are especially concerning because they can act as backdoors to leak infor-
mation or kill switches to disrupt operations.
The proliferation of counterfeit components has made it necessary for manufac-
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turers and distributors to inspect incoming electronic components for authenticity.
Physical evaluation processes range in complexity from visual inspection of the ex-
terior component packaging using a low power microscope to internal analysis of a
component’s chemical composition using techniques such as X-ray fluorescence and
Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy. Electrical inspection techniques are also
often employed including parametric, functional, burn-in, and structural tests [43].
In addition to trying to detect existing counterfeit components, new anti-counterfeit
mechanisms have also been developed which can be put in place during the design
of new chips so they can be uniquely identified [43]. Prior research efforts have in-
vestigated the effectiveness of injecting specific compounds during the component
manufacturing process to improve the RF fingerprinting performance [65] and in-
tentionally inserting information into hidden device side-channels to act as a water-
mark [8].
One way that the Department Of Defense (DOD) is responding to the threat of
counterfeit and Trojan hardware is by investing in the research groups at academic
institutions. One such group, the University of Connecticut’s Center for Hardware
Assurance, Security, and Engineering (CHASE), received a $7.5 million grant in
2014 from the DOD to study security for nanoscale devices [98]. Commercial prod-
ucts to screen for counterfeit devices have also become available such as the Ad-
vanced Detection of Electronic Counterfeits (ADEC) system sold by Nokomis Inc.
which analyzes URE using non-contact and non-invasive methods to detect counter-
feits. Since ADEC is a proprietary technology, many of the implementation details
are protected; however, patent filings suggest that the system may use a signal gen-
erator to stimulate a DUT and then collect emitted RF energy using an antenna ar-
ray [63, 64]. Marketing literature from Nokomis Inc. claims that the ADEC system
achieved 100% accuracy in two blind pilot tests in which 7 ADUM5241ARZ digital
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isolator chips and 40 Atmel AT89S52 8-bit MCUs were correctly identified as being
counterfeit or authentic [62]. Another company, Power FingerPrinting (PFP) Cy-
bersecurity Inc., has developed their own technology for detecting counterfeit hard-
ware based on observing side channel information such as power consumption. A
test of the PFP solution examining 9 different samples of Intel’s TB28F400B5-T80
Flash memory correctly identified 100% of the counterfeit parts [88].
Prior research efforts have demonstrated the ability to extract information from
a variety of side-channels to detect counterfeit/Trojan devices including path de-
lay [58], thermal profiling [72], and power consumption [32]. The two RF-DNA
based techniques evaluated in this research effort build on prior AFIT work that
successfully demonstrated device discrimination using the Multiple Discriminant
Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) and Generalized Relevance Learning
Vector Quantized-Improved (GRLVQI) classification techniques with RF-DNA fin-
gerprints generated from URE. Using RF-DNA with MDA/ML, [14] evaluated URE
from 40 PIC24 16-bit MCUs and achieved a percent correct classification (%C) of
%C > 90% for SNRA ≥ 15 dB and an average Equal Error Rate (EER) for ver-
ification of EERAve < 0.05%. Later, [102] evaluated the verification performance
of ten Allen Bradley PLCs using GRLVQI with RF-DNA fingerprints and achieved
EERAve ≤ 1.6% at SNR = 15 dB.
A process that is similar to the matched filtering technique used in this research
has been applied to device identification before by analyzing the IRE of Ethernet
packets to discriminate between Ethernet cards [38]. To this researcher’s knowl-
edge, the current effort is the first to apply matched filtering for device discrimina-
tion based on URE.
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2.2.2 Operation Validation and Reverse Engineering.
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks have become
increasingly vulnerable to cyber attack in recent years as they have grown in com-
plexity and become connected to the open Internet. Malicious hackers have recently
exploited SCADA vulnerabilities to take control of critical systems, causing them
to execute unauthorized operations that cause physical damage [131, 132]. Since
the embedded hardware used in SCADA systems is often unable to defend itself
by running anti-virus software due to limited processing capabilities, it is necessary
to develop external monitoring methods that can verify critical system operation.
Analyzing side-channels such as power consumption [13, 41], URE [102, 129], and
Modbus/TCP register values [36] can provide vital insight into the actual operation
of embedded devices to detect deviations from the authorized program.
Embedded devices commonly run a single application that performs a small
number of repetitive actions such as actuating an electrical relay, controlling a pump,
or collecting sensor readings which results in a small externally visible state space
[13]. One approach to detect anomalous behavior in embedded systems is to mon-
itor side-channel information for deviations from normal operation. Prior research
analyzing the dynamic power consumption of a PIC18 8-bit MCU on a transceiver
board generated a reference template representing normal operation by averaging
over numerous training collections. Test signals were then collected and subdivided
into small regions which were compared to the corresponding sections of the ref-
erence signal using correlation. The technique was able to discriminate between
execution of the original and modified code to sending encrypted and unencrypted
unicast transmissions with 100% accuracy [41].
Correlation-Based Anomaly Detection (CBAD) is another correlation based
technique that has been demonstrated to successfully detect anomalous program
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Figure 6. CBAD process comparing the current unknown sequence, XC [n], to the ref-
erence sequence representing normal operating conditions, XN [n]. A binary decision
is made to declare XC [n] the result of either a) normal operating conditions (zV ≤ tV )
or b) anomalous operation conditions (zV > tV ) [102].
execution based on observed URE. The CBAD process calculates the difference be-
tween the auto-correlation of a reference signal representing normal operating con-
ditions, XN [n], and the cross-correlation of that reference with the current unknown
signal, XC [n], as shown in Figure 6. A difference function, f∆(C∆[k]), produces a
test statistic value, zV , which is compared to a threshold, tV , to make a binary dec-
laration that XC [n] resulted from normal (zV ≤ tV ) or anomalous (zV > tV ) oper-
ating conditions [102].
When used to detect anomalous execution in ten Allen Bradley PLCs, a version
of the CBAD technique using Hilbert transformed sequences achieved verification
performance of EER ≤ 10% for all ten PLC devices at SNR = 0 dB [102]. A simi-
lar CBAD process using Hilbert transforms was able to detect a modified version of
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm running on a MSP430 16-bit
MCU with EER ≤ 10% at SNR = 10 dB [129]. While the CBAD approach has
proven itself effective for detecting anomalous behavior, it only produces a binary
decision of normal or anomalous and does not provide any additional information
about the type of anomalous behavior.
Rather than using deviations from normal behavior to detect anomalous pro-
gram execution, this research effort investigated the ability to estimate the individ-
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ual instructions executed by a MCU. A sequence of extracted instructions can be
compared to the authorized program to verify the device’s operation. In addition
to identifying anomalous execution, this approach has the added benefit that it can
provide information about the unauthorized sequence of instructions which may
help to determine the source of an anomaly.
A large portion of the existing body of SCA research targets encryption algo-
rithms using methods such as power analysis [4, 61, 78] or template attacks [3, 5, 37,
42]. Those cryptographic focused efforts often target a specific encryption imple-
mentation, the details of which are known to the attacker, with the goal being to
extract the secret key.
The emerging field of SCA for Reverse Engineering (SCARE) began exploit-
ing side-channel leakage to recover non-trivial details about the way cryptographic
functions were implemented. One of the first proposed SCARE efforts targeted
substitution block lookup tables to attack a secret authentication and session key
generation algorithm on Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards in Global Sys-
tem for Mobile (GSM) communication networks [83]. A later SCARE attack tar-
geting block cipher Data Encryption Standard (DES) managed to retrieve details
about some of the constants used by the algorithm for permutation tables and key
scheduling as well as implementation choices such as the register where subkeys
were loaded [23].
More recently, SCARE efforts have focused on extracting information about the
executed code and processed data in simple microprocessor devices. The Java Card
Virtual Machine was one of the first SCARE targets which was attacked to extract
executed bytecodes [60, 123]. The research presented in [39] examined the types of
information that could be gathered from single side-channel observations and laid
the groundwork for later efforts targeting the executed operations in 8-bit MCUs.
25
A SCARE effort analyzing power signatures from an 8-bit PIC16 MCU correctly
identified executed instructions with recognition rates around 66% using Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) and 70% using Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA).
When hidden Markov Chains were also applied to help identify the most likely in-
structions to have occurred it increased the recognition rate by 17% [33]. A later
research effort analyzing power consumption of an 8-bit ATMega163 MCU running
the RSA signature screening algorithm claimed to have achieved 100% correct clas-
sification using PCA to identify 39 commonly used instructions [81, 82]; however,
other sources were unable to reproduce those results [108].
The Side-ChANnel-based DisAssembLer using Local Electromagnetic Emana-
tions (SCANDALee) project extracted executed code from an 8-bit PICF687 MCU
based on URE and is the prior effort most closely related to the current research.
The SCANDALee collection process is destructive and requires decapsulation of the
DUT. A localized RF probe is place at 20 different locations in a 4 × 5 grid over
the DUT to capture emissions. To produce training signals for each instruction,
the registers were loaded with random data and the instruction to be learned was
repeated with other random instructions executed before and after it. The SCAN-
DALee research evaluated Multiclass Fisher’s LDA (M-LDA) and Polychotomous
LDA (P-LDA) techniques for dimensionality reduction. The template for each in-
struction class was formed from the mean and covariance matrix of the training col-
lections [107, 108]. Table 3 provides a comparison showing how this research effort
differed from the approach taken with SCANDALee including the choice of DUT,
collection methods, and classification processes. SCANDALee achieved an instruc-
tion recognition rate of 96.24% using test patterns and 87.69% using a real code
implementation of the AES [108].
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Table 3. Comparison showing differences between SCANDALee [108] and the current
research effort.
SCANDALee Current Research
DUT
PIC16F687
8-bit MCU
MSP430F5529
16-bit MCU
Evaluated
Instructions
36 instructions
(4 clock cycles each)
12 instructions
(1 clock cycle each)
URE Collection
Methods
RF probe @ 20 locations
(decapsulated DUT)
RF probe @ 1 location
(non-destructive, non-contact)
Analysis
Methods
M-LDA
P-LDA
MDA/ML (w/ RF-DNA)
GRLVQI (w/ RF-DNA)
Matched Filtering (w/ TD)
2.3 MSP430 Device Description
Prior research efforts focused on reverse-engineering MCU operations have ana-
lyzed simple 8-bit MCUs like the PIC16 [33, 39, 107, 108] and ATMega163 [81, 82].
In 2011, 16-bit MCUs became the largest market segment, surpassing 4 and 8-bit
MCUs as being the most commonly shipped devices [52]. To maintain relevance
with current trends, this research effort selected the MSP430F5529 16-bit MCU
manufactured by Texas Instruments [117] as the DUT because it is widely used
and representative of modern MCU architecture and semiconductor manufactur-
ing processes. Although the exact fabrication details are proprietary, the MSP430
was most likely fabricated using a 65 nm process [119].
The MSP430 utilizes a Reduced Instruction Set Computing (RISC) architecture
with 27 instructions having zero, one, or two operands with each operand using one
of seven possible addressing modes. Information about the addressing modes is in-
cluded in Appendix A. The execution time of a each operation ranges from one to
six clock cycles depending on the instruction and addressing mode used as demon-
strated by Table 4 which lists several instruction/addressing mode combinations
and their corresponding execution duration [118]. This variable execution time
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Table 4. Example MSP430 instruction and addressing mode combinations with dif-
ferent execution durations [118].
Instruction
Mnemonic
SRC
Addressing Mode
DST
Addressing Mode
Execution
Duration
MOV.B Register Register 1 Cycle
MOV.B Register Indexed 3 Cycles
MOV.B Indirect Register Indexed 4 Cycles
MOV.B Indexed Indexed 5 Cycles
XOR.B Register Register 1 Cycle
XOR.B Register Indexed 4 Cycles
XOR.B Indirect Register Indexed 5 Cycles
XOR.B Indexed Indexed 6 Cycles
complicates the process of reverse-engineering executed operations from observed
URE because it is difficult to determine when one operation ends execution and the
next one begins in a long sequence of unknown operations. Prior research efforts
analyzing the simpler 8-bit PIC16 MCU did not have to address this issue because
each instruction cycle of the PIC lasts exactly four clock cycles [33].
One possible approach for dealing with instructions that span multiple clock
cycles is to treat each clock cycle as consecutive, individual instructions and cre-
ate classification templates for each one [81]. Given the number of valid MSP430
instruction/addressing mode combinations and their respective durations, such an
approach would result in 1980 single cycle “instruction” templates which is beyond
a reasonable scope for this effort. Therefore, for the purpose of operation identi-
fication, the scope of this research was limited to only consider the Format I in-
structions listed in Table 5 using the register-to-register addressing mode. The
input/output relationship of each operation and the affected status bits is not di-
rectly relevant to this research effort; however, it has been included in Table 5 for
completeness. The MSP430 Format I operations require two operands, SRC and
DST, and have an effective duration of one clock cycle when using the register-to-
register addressing mode [118].
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Table 5. MSP430 Double-Operand (Format I) Instructions [118].
Status Bits
Mnemonic Operation
V N Z C
MOV.B src → dst - - - -
ADD.B src + dst → dst * * * *
ADDC.B src + dst + C → dst * * * *
SUB.B dst + .not.src + 1 → dst * * * *
SUBC.C dst + .not.src + C → dst * * * *
CMP.B dst - src * * * *
DADD.B src + dst + C → dst (decimally) * * * *
BIT.B src .and. dst 0 * * Z¯
BIC.B .not.src .and. dst → dst - - - -
BIS.B src .or. dst → dst - - - -
XOR.B src .xor. dst → dst * * * Z¯
AND.B src .and. dst → dst 0 * * Z¯
This subset of instructions was selected for evaluation because register-to-register
operations are commonly used in compiled code. For example, a disassembly analy-
sis of the AES-128 encryption/decryption function [114] compiled for the MSP430F5529
revealed that approximated 29% of the Format I instructions in the routine used
the register-to-register addressing mode. Due to the proprietary nature of the MSP430,
there is very little official documentation that reveals implementation details about
its architecture. According to a thread on the Texas Instrument E2E forum [116],
although the MSP430 process is not pipelined, it does have the ability to pre-fetch
the next instruction if the destination address of the current instruction is a regis-
ter. For the purposes of this research the existence of a pre-fetch stage is ignored
and, per the User’s Guide, all of the register-to-register operations are treated as
having an execution duration of one clock cycle [118].
2.4 Signal Collection
One common avenue for SCA of MCUs is to analyze the power consumption
of the DUT. This is typically accomplished by measuring the voltage across a shunt
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resistor which is connected between the device GND and power supply. While power
analysis has provided successful results in other research efforts [33, 39, 81, 82], it
requires a contact probe to be physically connected to the DUT which could po-
tentially interfere with device operations. Other prior research focused on reverse-
engineering MCU operations from URE used a non-contact EM probe to collect
emissions; however, the techniques used there required the DUT to be decapsulated
and thus left physical traces [107, 108]. Techniques that require chip decapsulation
may be useful in a laboratory test setting, but they are impractical for a deployed
monitoring implementation because they are destructive to the DUT.
This research effort used a RF near-field probe similar to other AFIT research
efforts to collect URE from above the surface of the chip package [14–16, 100–105,
127–129]. Using the near-field probe provides a non-destructive RF signal collection
method which will not interfere with the DUT’s normal operation and will support
future in situ analysis of legacy systems.
2.5 RF-DNA-Based Classification
“RF-DNA” is itself not a classification method and only refers to the process
used to extract statical values from RF emissions to generate “RF fingerprints”.
The resulting fingerprints can then be evaluated using a variety classification meth-
ods. The following two sections describe the classification methods that were used
in this research to classify RF-DNA fingerprints: MDA/ML and GRLVQI.
2.5.1 MDA/ML Classifier.
Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) is a multi-class form of Fisher’s (two-
class) LDA extended to evaluate NC classes. The MDA projection matrix, W, is
used to project an Nf -dimensional RF-DNA fingerprint vector, F, in NC − 1 space
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Figure 7. Representative MDA projection of NC=3 class inputs onto two possible
NC−1=2-dimensional subspaces [90].
[74] as illustrated in Figure 7 for NC = 3 classes. The set of NTng fingerprints for
each of the NC classes are use to generate a projection matrix W which optimally
maximizes the inter-class distance and minimizes the intra-class distance. The
MDA process assumes a Gaussian distribution of input data and the transformed
features remain Gaussian distributed. The projected training fingerprints are used
to determine the mean location for each class in NC − 1 space.
To classify an unknown test input, test statistics, such as the Euclidean distance
to the mean class locations, are calculated from the projected input fingerprint for
each of the NC classes. A Maximum Likelihood (ML) decision is made by choosing
the class with the smallest distance from the projected fingerprint and assigning it
as the estimated class for the unknown test input. The MDA model development
and classification processes used in this research were conducted in accordance with
prior AFIT RF-DNA research [14–16, 26, 29, 47, 67, 68, 91–93, 109, 110, 124, 125, 127]
and are described in Section 3.4.2 and Section 3.5.1.
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Figure 8. Representative GRLVQI classification assigning unknown fingerprint, F, to
class Ci based upon the minimum Euclidean distance to prototype vectors [90].
2.5.2 GRLVQI Classifier.
GRLVQI is an Artificial Neural Network (ANN)-based classification process
that uses iterative learning to generate a set of NP “prototype vectors” that de-
scribe each of the NC classes [45, 77] as illustrated in Figure 8 for NC = 3 classes.
The learning process supports Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) to define
the prototype vectors using a subset of the total Nf RF-DNA features by select-
ing the most relevant features; however, this research effort only considered full-
dimensional fingerprints. GRLVQI was adopted for AFIT RF-DNA research [26,
66–68, 90–93, 102, 127] because it overcomes some of the drawbacks of MDA/ML,
including [45,77]:
• Each RF-DNA fingerprint feature is assigned a relevance rank measuring its
significance to the overall classification decision.
• Feature selection is performed in conjunction with classification.
• There are no assumptions made or knowledge required regarding the input
data distribution.
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• Processing is well-suited for noisy or inconsistent input data.
Details about the GRLVQI model development and classification processes used
in this research are provided in Section 3.4.3 and Section 3.5.2, respectively.
2.6 Correlation-Based Classification
Correlation is a very useful tool for detecting signals that are corrupted by ad-
ditive random noises [73]. The mathematical operation of correlation used to im-
plement a “correlator” takes a signal and correlates it with a replica of itself. A
“matched filter” uses the related mathematical operation of convolution to convolve
a signal with the mirror image of the signal, delayed by its time duration. For this
document, the term “matched filter” will be used synonymously with “correlator”
because the matched filter convolution of a signal and its time-reversed-and-delayed
replica produces the same output as correlation between the signal and its replica
at the end of the time duration [99].
The correlation processing used in this research is similar to that used for sym-
bol estimation in a traditional digital communication system [89, 99] whereas the
CBAD methods used in prior research [102, 103, 105, 128, 129] were more consis-
tent with correlation techniques commonly used in other fields like image processing
that require signal identification in noisy environments [28]. The goal of the CBAD
process was to make the binary decision whether a device was executing normal
or anomalous operations from observed URE. CBAD declared an unknown input
emission as normal or anomalous depending on how closely it was correlated to a
reference signal representing the expected normal behavior [102, 103, 105, 128, 129].
This research differs from the CBAD approach because it aims to classify an un-
known input emission as corresponding to one of several possible devices or MCU
operations. Rather than comparing an input emission to a single “normal” refer-
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ence signal, the input emission is evaluated using a bank a parallel matched filters
corresponding to each of the possible devices or MCU operations.
The matched filters used discrete correlation given by
y[n] =
∞∑
k=−∞
h[n− k]x[k] (1)
to compare the unknown input emission, xUnk, with a reference signal, xRef , corre-
sponding on of the possible devices or MCU operations. The output is a single test
statistic value, zV , which is equivalent to the cross-correlation of xRef and xUnk at
k = 0 time lag, calculated as
zV = y[0] =
N∑
k=0
xRef [k]xUnk[k] (2)
with a higher value of zV represents a closer match between xUnk and xRef . From
an a-posterior probability perspective, the raw zV test statistics can be used to in-
dependently implement the classification and verification processes [16].
As discussed in Chapter I, the motivation for using correlation is that it a rela-
tively simple function that is well suited for implementation in systems with limited
computing capability. The execution cost of other classification processes can vary
greatly, but the computational cost of correlation is predictable and well bounded.
For two discrete sequences of length N , the computational time complexity is com-
putable and analytically bounded by O(N2) [102].
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Figure 9. Block diagram outlining the methodology described in Chapter III.
This chapter provides details on the research methodology and process stages
outlined in Figure 9 which were used to generate the results presented in Chap-
ter IV. First, the operating conditions of the MSP430 Device Under Test (DUT)
during signal collection for device discrimination and operation identification are
discussed in Section 3.1. Details about the configuration of the acquisition hard-
ware are described in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 describes the series of Digital Sig-
nal Processing (DSP) steps applied to all collected Unintentional Radio-Frequency
(RF) Emissions (URE) to generate RF Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) finger-
prints and truncated waveforms for matched filtering. Details about the generation
of the Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML), General-
ized Relevance Learning Vector Quantized-Improved (GRLVQI), and matched fil-
tering classification models are discussed in Section 3.4. The methods used to eval-
uate and present results for classification and verification performance are described
in Sections 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. Finally, Section 3.7 describes the process used
to evaluate the computational cost associated with each of the three classification
methods.
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3.1 MSP430 Operating Conditions
This section provides details about the NDev = 10 MSP430F5529 MicroCon-
troller Units (MCUs) which were evaluated for this research and their physical op-
erating conditions during URE acquisition. The purchased devices were mounted
on the MSP-EXP430F5529 Experimenter Board [115] which was used to control
the DUT during collections. Assembly code was used to write different software
routines to execute during acquisition for the purposes of device discrimination or
operation identification.
3.1.1 Evaluated Devices.
Table 6 shows the MSP430F5529 revision and MSP-EXP430F5529 board man-
ufacturing lot information for each of the NDev = 10 devices. NDevAuth = 8 of the
DUTs were treated as “authorized” devices and evaluated for device classification.
The remaining NDevRogue = 2 DUTs were treated as unauthorized “rogue” devices
and considered for device verification. However, all evaluated devices were actually
new, authentic MSP-EXP430F5529 Experimenter Boards.
The MSP-EXP430F5529 boards selected to represent “authentic” devices all
contained Rev. F MSP430F5529 MCUs whereas the boards representing “rogue”
devices used the older Rev. E MSP430F5529. Although both versions of the MCU
are functionally similar, the minor differences between revisions may impact URE.
The Rev. F and Rev. E devices were grouped as “authentic” and “rogue” to sim-
ulate the differences that may exist between real and counterfeit/altered devices.
In reality, Rev. F of the MSP430F5529 fixed several bugs from Rev. E related to
the Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC), flash memory, Power Management Mod-
ule (PMM), system module, Unified Clock System (UCS), and Universal Serial Bus
(USB) as well as introduced a new error in the BootStrap Loader (BSL) [120].
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Table 6. DUT Names Mapped to NDev=10 MSP-EXP430F5529 Boards
DUT MSP-EXP430F5529 MSP430F5529
Name Manufacturing Lot Revision
Auth1 01182013GM F
Auth2 01182013GM F
Auth3 01182013GM F
Auth4 01182013GM F
Auth5 01182013GM F
Auth6 01182013GM F
Auth7 01182013GM F
Auth8 01182013GM F
RogueA 09052012S2 E
RogueB 11202012 E
The DUT named “RogueA” was arbitrarily selected as the device to use for
evaluating operation identification and all training and testing emissions for that
purpose were collected from it. This research effort did not evaluate the effective-
ness of using training emissions collected from one device to estimate operations
using testing emissions collected from a different device.
3.1.2 DUT Configuration.
The eZUSB connector of the MSP-EXP430F5529 Experimenter Board was con-
nected to a host desktop computer which provided power to the DUT and was
used to load the software routines to execute during URE collection. The MSP-
EXP430F5529 is a development board which contains a variety of peripherals in-
cluding an accelerometer, potentiometer, Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) screen,
and capacitive touchpad buttons [115]. To reduce the impact that these periph-
erals might have on URE collected above the MSP430 chip, all non-critical board
elements were powered-off and disconnected by removing jumper pins. The only
jumpers that remained were the MSP430 jumper, which provided power to the
MCU, and the DVCC, TXD, RXD, RST, and TEST jumpers.
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The DUT was configured to operate at a Master CLocK (MCLK) frequency of
fMCLK = 1.049MHz which was derived from an internal trimmed low-frequency
REFerence Oscillator (REFO) with a typical frequency of fREFOCLK = 32.768
kHz. A Frequency Locked Loop (FLL) used the REFO with a frequency integra-
tor to drive a Digitally Controlled Oscillator (DCO) which provided the MCLK sig-
nal [118].
After a DUT is initially powered, the URE may exhibit a temperature-dependency
as the device warms up to its normal operating temperature [15]. To compensate
for these effects, each DUT was allowed to run for fives minutes prior to signal col-
lection to allow the temperature to stabilize. A hand-held InfraRed (IR) thermome-
ter was used to measure and record the surface temperature at the center of the
MSP430F5529 after the five minute warm up period. Table 7 shows that all DUTs
had a surface temperature between 73.5 ◦F and 75.0 ◦F prior to acquisition.
Table 7. Surface Temperature of DUT in Fahrenheit After Five Minute Warm-Up
Period Prior to First Acquisition
DUT Name Auth Rogue
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 A B
Temperature (◦F) 74.0 74.5 74.5 74.5 75.0 75.0 75.0 74.5 75.0 73.5
3.1.3 Program Sequence for Device Discrimination.
For the purpose of device discrimination, a single software routine was created
which executed the sequence of nine operations shown in Table 8 which corresponds
to a subsection of the MSP430 AES-128 encryption function distributed by Texas
Instruments [114]. The specific subsection was selected because it contains a variety
of Format I operations using different addressing modes. The sequence has a total
duration of 16 clock cycles with individual instructions having durations of one,
two, or three cycles.
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Table 8. Subsection of AES-128 Encryption Function Used as Program Sequence for
Device Discrimination with Clock Cycle Durations Listed for Each Instruction
XOR.B R8, R12 ; 1 clock cycle
XOR.B R9, R12 ; 1 clock cycle
MOV.B R12, 0(R10) ; 3 clock cycles
MOV.B 4(R1), R12 ; 3 clock cycles
ADD.B #1, R12 ; 1 clock cycle
MOV.B R12, R13 ; 1 clock cycle
MOV.W R13, 4(R1) ; 3 clock cycles
CMP.B #4, R12 ; 1 clock cycle
MOV.W R13, R13 ; 2 clock cycles
For each of the NDev = 10 DUTs, the 16 cycle sequence was repeated enough
times to collect NB = 5000 emissions per DUT. The NB = 5000 emissions were
then separated into two sets: NTng = 1000 training emissions to develop the classifi-
cation model and NTst = 4000 testing emissions to evaluate its performance.
Early experiments showed that the act of physically swapping out devices in the
acquisition fixture produced variations in the observed URE that could potentially
bias the device classification process. Initially, emissions were collected from each
DUT over NAcq = 2 separate acquisition sessions with the DUTs being removed
and replaced in the acquisition fixture between sessions. Matched filter templates
were then generated using an equal number of training emissions from each of the
NAcq = 2 sessions per DUT. When the testing emissions for each DUT were eval-
uated using the corresponding matched filter template for that DUT, the resulting
test statistics were distributed such that it was possible to distinguish many of the
emissions as having originated from one of the NAcq = 2 acquisition session.
Efforts were made to maintain consistent DUT and probe placement between
acquisition sessions by using the custom built device mount described in Section 3.2.1
and keeping the horizontal XY position of the probe constant between sessions.
The probe was only raised and lowered vertically as required to exchange DUTs
and it was always returned to the same resting position on the surface of the chip
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package. The post-collection processing steps described in Section 3.3.1 were also
applied to reduce the impact of collection bias. Despite these efforts, minor differ-
ences in URE persisted which often made it possible to distinguish individual col-
lection sessions from each other.
As the number of acquisition sessions per DUT was increased, the impact of
the differences between collection sessions decreased and the resulting distribution
of test statistics approached a Gaussian. After additional experimentation, it was
determined that increasing the number of acquisition sessions to NAcq = 5 pro-
vided a distribution of test statistics that reasonably approximated a Gaussian
as illustrated in Figure 10. Therefore, to reduce the impact of collection bias, the
NB = 5000 emissions for each DUT were collected over the course of NAcq = 5
acquisition sessions per DUT with the DUT being physically removed and then
repositioned in the test fixture between each session. The groups of NTng = 1000
training and NTst = 4000 testing emissions per DUT were formed such that they
contained an equal number of emissions from each of the NAcq = 5 sessions.
3.1.4 Program Sequence for Operation Identification.
For the purpose of operation identification, the scope of this research was lim-
ited to only consider the following NOp = 12 Format I operations using the register-
to-register addressing mode: ADD.B, ADDC.B, AND.B, BIC.B, BIS.B, BIT.B, CMP.B,
DADD.B, MOV.B, SUB.B, SUBC.B, and XOR.B. All instructions were configured to use
registers R4 and R5 as the SouRCe (SRC) and DeSTination (DST) registers, respec-
tively. To eliminate the impact that changes in the Hamming weight of operand
and results values can have on URE [100], all registers were initialized to contain
the value zero prior to execution which prevented the result values stored into R5
from changing as the operations were repeated.
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Figure 10. Stacked histogram of matched filter test statistics for device classification
from NTst=4000 testing emissions collected equally over NAcq=5 acquisition sessions.
The matched filter template was generated from NTng=1000 separate training emis-
sions which were collected during the same NAcq=5 acquisition sessions. The results
shown were produced using Auth1 and are representative of other devices.
Separate software routines were created for each of the NOp = 12 operations
to be evaluated which began by generating a signal pulse on a General Purpose In-
put/Output (GPIO) line of the MSP430 DUT to trigger acquisition and then re-
peated the operation of interest for a set number of times. Each of the NOp = 12
software routines were executed enough times to collect NB = 5000 emissions for
each operation which were then separated into two sets: NTng = 1000 training emis-
sions and NTst = 4000 testing emissions. All NB × NOp = 5000 × 12 = 60000
emissions were collected in a single session without moving the probe or DUT to
avoid collection bias due to repositioning.
3.2 RF Signal Collection
This sections provides details about the hardware and configuration used for the
acquisition system.
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Figure 11. XYZ table, RF near-field probe, and DUT in custom mount used for URE
collection. This is the same acquisition system used in [100,101,128,129].
3.2.1 Acquisition System.
A computer controlled XYZ table was used to position a Riscure high-sensitivity
RF near-field probe [94] above the DUT which was held stationary in the custom
built device mount shown in Figure 11. The probe was lowered to rest above the
surface of the MSP430 chip package and the metal shroud was lowered to shield the
probe tip from the surrounding environment.
The RF near-field probe was sampled using a Teledyne LeCroy WavePro 760Zi-
A oscilloscope which is capable of sample rates up to fS = 40 Gsps with 8-bit of
resolution and 6 GHz of bandwidth. Previous Air Force Institute of Technology
(AFIT) RF-DNA research efforts typically used sample rates around fS = 200 Msps
to fS = 1 Gsps.
Initial experiments for this research effort sampled URE at a higher rate of
fS = 10 Gsps and then down sampled the data to lower rates of fS = 1 Gsps by
taking every tenth sample and fS = 250 Msps by taking every fortieth sample. The
matched filtering classification process described in this chapter was used to eval-
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Figure 12. Measured frequency response of Mini-Circuits BLP-90+ Coaxial LPF
with nominal -3 dB cutoff frequency fCO=90 MHz.
uate the data at each of the three sample rates. The data that was down sampled
to fS = 1 Gsps achieved classification performance that was statistically equiva-
lent to the original fS = 10 Gsps data with confidence intervals of CI = 95% and
the fS = 250 Msps data performed statistically worse than the other two sample
rates. Based on these results, all future URE acquisitions were collected and ana-
lyzed at fS = 1 Gsps. To prevent aliasing, a Mini-Circuits BLP-90+ coaxial Low
Pass Filter (LPF) with a passband spanning DC to 81 MHz and a nominal -3 dB
cutoff frequency of fCO = 90 MHz was inserted between the probe and the oscillo-
scope [79]. The frequency response of the LPF is shown in Figure 12 as measured
using a network analyzer.
A significant amount of clock jitter was observed in the MSP430 MCLK sig-
nal during initial experiments. The DUT had a nominal operating frequency of
fMCLK = 1.049MHz which corresponds to a clock period of TMCLK = 953.3 ns;
however, clock periods were observed in the range of TMCLK ∈ [908, 1002] ns as
shown in Table 9. The varying clock frequency may have been a side effect of the
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Table 9. Minimum, Maximum, and Mean Observed MCLK Periods from NB=5000
Acquisitions of NDev=10 DUTs Executing the Routine for Device Discrimination
DUT Name Min TMCLK (ns) Max TMCLK (ns) Mean TMCLK (ns)
Auth1 920 969 945.6
Auth2 940 988 954.7
Auth3 921 968 952.3
Auth4 914 949 944.5
Auth5 925 972 943.6
Auth6 943 990 951.0
Auth7 908 955 950.1
Auth8 932 980 949.3
RogueA 949 1002 955.4
RogueB 917 954 946.2
FLL used to generate the MCLK signal. It is also possible that the jitter was an in-
tentional design feature to curtail the harmonic content of the square wave. Using
a dithered clock which intentionally varies the clock frequency by a small amount is
a recommended technique for spreading emissions out in the frequency spectrum to
reduce the strength at any single frequency [86].
The signal processing techniques used in this research required precise alignment
of sampled URE with clock cycle edges to subdivide and truncate signals. GPIO
line 7.7 of the MSP430 DUT was configured to output the MSP430 MCLK signal
which was sampled and recorded on a secondary oscilloscope channel via a contact
probe. Another contact probe was also connected to GPIO line 1.0 of the MSP430
DUT to trigger acquisitions based on the software generated pulse. All signal col-
lections were stored and processed using Matlabr software.
3.2.2 RF Near-Field Probe Placement.
To determine the collection location that would provide the best discrimination
between devices using matched filtering classification, the RF probe was physically
located over a 25 × 25 grid spanning the surface of three arbitrarily chosen DUTs
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Figure 13. Summed variance of URE between (a) DUT ∈{Auth1, Auth2, RogueA}
and (b) operation ∈ {ADD.B, AND.B, MOV.B, XOR.B,} at 25×25 locations above the
MSP430F5529. The circled locations were selected to collect emissions for (a) de-
vice discrimination and (b) operation identification based on the maximum summed
variance between classes. The grid values were normalized for display purposes with
lighter colors representing higher summed variance values.
(Auth1, Auth2, and RogueA) executing a repeated XOR.B operation. The URE col-
lected from each DUT at each location, L, within the 25 × 25 grid were evaluated
using
argmax
L
(
N∑
k=1
V ar(xAuth1,L[k], xAuth2,L[k], xRogueA,L[k])
)
(3)
where V ar denotes variance and N is the number of samples in each collected emis-
sion, x. The probe location that provided the maximum summed inter-device vari-
ance is circled in Figure 13a and was used to collect URE for the purpose of device
discrimination.
A similar process was used to determine the best collection location for opera-
tion identification using an arbitrarily chosen DUT, RogueA. URE were collected
at each location within a 25× 25 grid while RogueA repeatedly executed one of four
arbitrarily chosen operations (ADD.B, AND.B, MOV.B, XOR.B). The probe location
that provided the maximum summed inter-operation variance
argmax
L
(
N∑
k=1
V ar(xADD.B,L[k], xAND.B,L[k], xMOV.B,L[k], xXOR.B,L[k])
)
(4)
45
was selected as the collection location for the purpose of operation identification
and is circled in Figure 13b.
3.3 Post Collection Processing
This section provides details about the post collection signal processing steps
shown in Figure 14. All collected emissions had the DC offset removed, simulated
noise added, and the average power normalized. Two separate processes were then
used to produce: 1) RF-DNA fingerprints to be used with MDA/ML and GRLVQI
classification and 2) Time Domain (TD) signals to be used with matched filtering
classification.
3.3.1 DC Bias Removal and Power Normalization.
Slight differences in the acquisition system configuration and probe position be-
tween URE collection sessions can impact the observed DC offset and signal power.
To reduce the impact of DC bias, the amplitude of each emission was centered by
subtracting the signal mean to remove the DC offset. This DC removal process was
accomplished prior to calculating the collected signal power to generate appropri-
ately scaled simulated noise.
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Figure 14. Block diagram outline the digital signal processing steps applied to all col-
lected URE to generate RF-DNA fingerprints and truncated waveforms for matched
filtering.
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Additionally, after adding simulated noise, the average power of each emission
was also normalized to reduce the effect of collection bias. This normalization pro-
cess was based on average power rather than maximum amplitude so that the cor-
relation process used for matched filtering would be sensitive to differences in signal
shape and not be impacted by signals having different average powers.
Other RF-DNA and Correlation-Based Anomaly Detection (CBAD) research
efforts have used additional post-collection signal processing stages including a
Band Pass Filter (BPF), Digital Down Conversion (DDC), and Hilbert Transform
(HT) [102, 105]. Preliminary experiments for this research effort used the matched
filtering techniques to classify emissions from NOp = 12 operations after applying
every permutation of the following processing stages:
• BPF ∈ {On,Off} with center frequency fC ∈ {3.5, 4.0, 4.5, ..., 33.5} MHz and
bandwidth W−3dB ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} MHz
• DDC ∈ {On,Off}
• HT ∈ {On,Off}
After analyzing all 1468 possible permutations of additional processing stages
it was determined that the best matched filtering classification performance was
achieved when none of the BPF, DDC, or HT stages were applied. Therefore, the
only post-collection processing applied to the collected emissions prior to RF-DNA
fingerprint generation or signal truncation for matched filtering were DC offset re-
moval and average power normalization.
3.3.2 SNR Scaling.
Since URE are themselves a type of noise, for this research the Signal-to-Noise
Ratio (SNR) at signal collection, SNRC , is assumed to be infinite with the entire
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Figure 15. Simulated frequency response of 8th order Butterworth LPF with fCO=90
MHz. Filter coefficients were generated using the Matlabr butter function.
acquired waveform representing useful signal content. To evaluate the impact of
SNR on classification and verification, like-filtered Additive White Gaussian Noise
(AWGN) was generated, scaled, and added to each collected waveform to simulate
a range of analysis SNRs, SNRA ∈ [−30, 30] in SNRA∆ = 5 dB intervals. Prior
work has shown that Gaussian distributed noise is an appropriate model for emis-
sion noise [39].
The Matlabr randn function was used to generate NNz = 1 independent
realization of normally distributed psuedorandom values for each of the NB =
5000 emissions collected per device or operation. The filter whose frequency re-
sponse is shown in Figure 15 was applied to the noise realization using the Mat-
labr filtfilt function to simulate the response of the in-line, anti-aliasing LPF
used during URE collection. The same filtered noise realizations were scaled to
achieve each of the desired SNRA points and added to the corresponding NB =
5000 emissions for each device or operation.
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Figure 16. Collected URE and MCLK signal from RogueA divided into NSR=32 sub-
regions at the rising and falling edges of MCLK to generate RF-DNA fingerprints for
device discrimination.
3.3.3 RF-DNA Fingerprint Generation.
The signal Region Of Interest (ROI) used for device discrimination corresponded
to the 16 clock cycle duration of the program described in Section 3.1.3. Prior re-
search determined that partitioning samples into subregions corresponding to inte-
ger multiples of the number of clock cycles in the ROI yielded statistically superior
results relative to partitioning based on fractional clock cycles [14]. Due to the ob-
served clock jitter, the two methods illustrated by Figure 16 were considered for
choosing the ROI and dividing it into subregions.
The first method used the recorded MCLK signal to individually select the ROI
for each emission that corresponded to exactly 16 clock cycles. The ROI was then
divided into NSR subregions precisely at the rising and falling edges of MCLK. This
resulted in a ROI and subregions that varied in length for each evaluated emission.
The second considered method truncated the ROI such that all recorded emissions
were the same length as the shortest observed emission and then divided the ROI
into NSR equal length subregions.
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Figure 17. Average MDA/ML classification performance evaluated at SNRC
for NDevAuth=8 device classes using RF-DNA fingerprints generated with
NSR∈{2,4,8,16,32} subregions divided at MCLK boundaries (red) or into equal in-
tervals (blue). Confidence intervals of CI=95% are approximately the same size or
smaller than the marker shapes and have been omitted for visual clarity.
To determine which ROI and subregion selection method produced the best de-
vice classification performance, NFP = 5000 RF-DNA fingerprints were generated
at SNRC using each method with NSR ∈ {2, 4, 8, 16, 32} subregions for each of
the NDevAuth = 8 authorized device classes. Those fingerprints where then evalu-
ated using MDA/ML classification as described in Section 3.4.2 and Section 3.5.1 to
compare the performance of each method. As shown in Figure 17, dividing the ROI
in NSR = 32 equal length subregions (blue) produced statistically better classifica-
tion performance when compared to the other evaluated methods (red). Therefore,
the results presented in Chapter IV for MDA/ML and GRLVQI device classification
and verification where generated using RF-DNA fingerprints with NSR = 32 equally
divided subregions.
For the purpose of operation identification, the ROI was selected to correspond
to a single MCLK cycle since all of the NOp = 12 register-to-register instructions
have an effective duration of one clock cycle [117]. To determine the optimal ROI
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Figure 18. Collected URE and MCLK signals corresponding to an XOR.B operation
divided into NSR=2 subregions at the rising and falling edges of MCLK to generate
RF-DNA fingerprints for operation identification. The XOR.B operation is representa-
tive of other MSP430 Format I instructions.
and subregion selection method to use for operation identification, the previously
described process was used to evaluate the MDA/ML classification performance of
differing subregion selection methods with NSR = 2 subregions. Dividing the ROI
into NSR = 2 subregions at MCLK edges achieved %CAve = 9.8% whereas dividing
the ROI into NSR = 2 equal subregions only achieved %CAve = 8.9% for NOp = 12
operation classes. Therefore, for the purpose of operation identification, the RF-
DNA fingerprints used to evaluate MDA/ML and GRLVQI classification were gen-
erated using NSR = 2 subregions divided at MCLK edges as shown in Figure 18.
RF-DNA fingerprints were generated for each of the NB = 5000 emissions per
device or operation using TD features in accordance with previous AFIT RF-DNA
fingerprinting research [127]. The RF-DNA process is based on complex signals
having In-phase (I) and Quadrature-phase (Q) components; however, the emissions
used in this research were collected and stored as real-valued TD sequences. The
Matlabr hilbert function was used to transform each real-valued sequence, x[n],
into the complex IQ representation xIQ[n] = xre[n] + xim[n]. The instantaneous
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amplitude a[n], phase φ[n], and frequency f [n] was calculated for each of the NSR
subregions and the total ROI as
a[n] =
√
xre[n]2 + xim[n]2 (5)
φ[n] = tan−1
[
xim[n]
xre[n]
]
, xre 6= 0 (6)
f [n] =
1
2pi
[
dφ[n]
dn
]
(7)
for the complex signal xIQ[n] = xre[n] + xim[n]. Then the standard deviation (σ),
variance (σ2), skewness (γ), and kurtosis (κ) of the instantaneous amplitude, phase,
and frequency of the signal was calculated within each of the NSR subregions as
well as the total ROI to produce Nf = 4× 3× (NSR + 1) statistical features.
The Nf = 4 × 3 × (32 + 1) = 396 statistical features resulting from the NSR =
32 subregions used for device discrimination were combined into a single vector as
shown in Table 10 to construct the RF-DNA fingerprint.
Table 10. Construction of RF-DNA fingerprint as used for device discrimination
with NDevSR=32 subregions to produce Nf=396 statistical features.
Statistic:σ σ2 γ κσ σ2 γ κ ...σ σ2 γ κσ σ2 γ κσ σ2 γ κ ...σ σ2 γ κσ σ2 γ κ ...σ σ2 γ κ
Region: SR=1 SR=2 ... SR=32 Total SR=1 ... Total SR=1 ... Total
Attribute: Amplitude Phase Frequency
Similarly, the Nf = 4 × 3 × (2 + 1) = 36 statistical features resulting from the
NSR = 2 subregions used for operation identification were combined into a single
vector as shown in Table 11.
Table 11. Construction of RF-DNA fingerprint as used for operation identification
with NSR=2 subregions to produce Nf=36 statistical features.
Statistic:σ σ2 γ κσ σ2 γ κσ σ2 γ κσ σ2 γ κσ σ2 γ κσ σ2 γ κσ σ2 γ κσ σ2 γ κσ σ2 γ κ
Region: SR=1 SR=2 Total SR=1 SR=2 Total SR=1 SR=2 Total
Attribute: Amplitude Phase Frequency
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Figure 19. Regions of an XOR.B operation having a longer clock period (bottom)
which were removed to match the length of the shortest observed waveform (top).
3.3.4 Matched Filtering Signal Truncation.
The correlation process used for matched filtering classification described in Sec-
tion 3.5.3 required that all of the waveforms have the same length. To remove the
effect of clock jitter shown in Table 9, the collected emissions were subdivided at
rising and falling clock edges using the recorded MCLK signal, then all of the half-
cycle segments were individually truncated to have the same length as the short-
est recorded segment. This truncation process is illustrated in Figure 19 using two
XOR.B operations and was applied to the emissions for both device discrimination
and operation identification.
3.4 Model Development
The MDA/ML, GRLVQI, and matched filter classification models where gener-
ated using a k-Fold Cross-Validation (kF-CV) process with NTng = 1000 training
emissions for each of the NC = NDevAuth = 8 classes for device classification or
NC = NOp = 12 classes for operation classification. The model for MDA/ML in-
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cludes a projection matrix, GRLVQI utilizes prototype vectors, and matched filter-
ing requires reference templates for each of the NC possible classes. For each of the
three classification techniques, a single model was developed at the highest evalu-
ated SNRA = 30 dB and then used to evaluate each of the NTst = 4000 emissions
per class across the full range of SNRA ∈ [−30, 30] in SNRA∆ = 5 dB intervals.
3.4.1 k-Fold Cross Validation.
In standard kF-CV, NTng training emissions are subdivided into k equal groups,
where k is a factor of NTng. One of the k subgroups is withheld for validation and
the remaining k − 1 groups are used to generate a model. The withheld valida-
tion group is used to evaluate that model’s performance and the process is repeated
until all k subgroups have been used as the validation group. The model that pro-
duces the best validation performance is chosen as the model for classification [95].
This standard kF-CV process was used in prior RF-DNA research [127].
A modified version of kF-CV was also considered for this research in which each
of the k subgroups was individually used to develop a model with the remaining
k − 1 groups withheld for validation. This modified kF-CV process was considered
because it is similar to the reference sequence selection process used in prior CBAD
research. For the CBAD process, a set of NPot = NTng + 1 potential reference se-
quences was constructed to consist of the NTng training sequences and the sequence
calculated as the average of the NTng sequences. Each of the NPot sequences was
considered individually as a potential reference and was evaluated against the re-
maining NPot − 1 sequences [102].
To determine which k value and kF-CV method provided the best performance,
the NB = 5000 emissions per device where evaluated using the matched filter clas-
sification methods described in Section 3.4.4 and Section 3.5.3 with reference tem-
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Figure 20. Average matched filtering device classification performance for
NDevAuth=8 authorized device classes. The reference templates were generated from
NTng=1000 emissions per device using standard and modified kF-CV processes with
k∈{2,4,5,8,10,20,25,40,50,100,125,200,250,500,1000}. Classification performance was eval-
uated at the collection SNR, SNRC , using NTst=4000 testing emissions per device.
Confidence intervals of CI=95% are approximately the same size or smaller than the
marker shapes and have been omitted for visual clarity.
plates developed using the standard and modified kF-CV methods for all valid val-
ues of k ∈ {2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 20, 25, 40, 50, 100, 125, 200, 250, 500, 1000}. The results in
Figure 20 show that the standard kF-CV process maintained similar classification
performance across all evaluated k values and outperformed the modified kF-CV
process for values of k ≤ 40.
Although the modified kF-CV did perform slightly better than the standard
kF-CV process at k = 8 and k = 20, it did not demonstrate consistently better
performance at lower values of k < 40. Since the modified kF-CV did not provide a
large or consistent performance gain over the standard kF-CV process, the decision
was made to use the standard kF-CV process as used in previous AFIT RF-DNA
research efforts.
Prior research recommended the use of k = 5 or k = 10 when the use of re-
peated cross-validation for larger k values is not feasible [95]. Therefore, the models
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for all three evaluated classification methods were generated using the standard kF-
CV process with k = 5. Although the decision to use standard kF-CV with k = 5
was based on the evaluated performance of NTst = 4000 testing emissions, the pro-
cess of generating and choosing the reference waveforms, given a specific kF-CV
method, only considered the NTng = 1000 training emissions to generate and evalu-
ate potential reference signals.
3.4.2 MDA/ML Projection Matrix Generation.
The model for MDA/ML classification is a projection matrix, W, which projects
an Nf -dimensional RF-DNA fingerprint vector, F, onto NC − 1 space [74]. For this
research, the Nf = 396-dimensional fingerprints used for device discrimination with
NDevAuth = 8 classes are projected into NDevAuth − 1 = 7-dimensional space. The
Nf = 36-dimensional fingerprints used for operation identification with NOp = 12
classes are projected into NOp − 1 = 11-dimensional space. The Multiple Discrim-
inant Analysis (MDA) model development process was conducted in accordance
with prior AFIT RF-DNA research [14,29,127].
The MDA transformation begins by finding the intra-class, Sw, and inter-class,
Sb, scatter matrices for a given set of training RF-DNA fingerprint vectors
Sw =
NC∑
i=1
PiΣi (8)
Sb =
NC∑
i=1
Pi(µi − µ0)(µi − µ0)T (9)
where Σi is the class covariance matrix and Pi is the prior probability for class Ci
[121]. For this research, Pi was assumed to be equal for all classes.
The N − 1 eigenvectors of S−1w Sb form the Nf × (NC − 1)-dimensional projection
matrix W which optimally maximizes the ratio of inter-class distance and intra-
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class variance [121]. An individual fingerprint vector, Fj, is then projected onto
(NC − 1)-dimensional MDA space by
FWj = WTFj (10)
The full MDA-projected training matrix, FWT , is the combination of MDA-projected
training fingerprints, FWj , where j ∈ {1, 2, ..., NTng}
FWT =

FW1
FW2
...
FWNTng

NTng×Nf
(11)
A multivariate normal distribution is fitted to the MDA-projected data and
the estimated distribution parameters (mean vector, µˆWi , and covariance matrix,
ΣˆWi ) for each class Ci. In accordance with previous efforts, a pooled estimate of
the covariance matrix is used instead of individual covariance matrices for each
class [121]. The output from the MDA model training process includes the follow-
ing:
• MDA projection matrix (W)
• NC sets of MDA-projected training fingerprints (FWCi)
• NC estimated mean vectors (µˆWi )
• pooled estimate of the covariance matrix (ΣˆWi )
The mean vector and covariance matrix for each device is the reference template
for that device [14].
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3.4.3 GRLVQI Prototype Vector Generation.
The GRLVQI model development process was conducted as described in prior
work [90] with the goal of defining classification boundaries that minimize the Bayes
risk. NP = 10 prototype vectors consisting of Nf RF-DNA fingerprint features were
defined to represent each of the NC classes. Matrix P of dimension (NC · NP ) × Nf
is formed from the collection of prototype vectors, pn. The best in-class, pI , and
out-of-class, pO, prototype vectors are differentially shifted by a distortion value,
dnλ, computed as [45]
dnλ =
Nf∑
i=1
λi(f
m
i − pni )2 (12)
where n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , NP}, fm is a randomly selected input fingerprint, pn ∈ P, and
λi is the relevance weights of the i
th feature, normalized such that ||λ||1 = 1 and
λi ≥ 0∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , Nf} [45].
The relevance weight, λi, is initialized to a random set of values at the begin-
ning of the classifier training process. To minimize the utilization of poor prototype
vectors, a bias parameter, Bn is calculated as
Bn = ψ(
1
NP
− F nold) (13)
where ψ is a user selected amount to scale the bias parameter and F nold is the fre-
quency at which a prototype vector is selected as the “best” prototype vector [77].
The bias parameter is applied to the original distortion value by
dnBias = d
n
λ −Bn (14)
The best in-class prototype vector, pI , is the pn with the same class label as
the randomly selected fm for which dnBias is the smallest and the best out-of-class
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prototype vector, pO, is the pn with a different class label than fm for which dnBias
is the smallest. The in-class distortion dI = dnBias is the distortion value that re-
sulted in the selection of pI . Similarly, the out-of-class distortion dO = dnBias is the
distortion value that resulted in the selection of pO.
After selecting the best in-class and out-of-class prototype vectors, the proto-
type vectors are updated by [45]
pI(t+ 1) = pI(t) +
4αI(t)f ′|µ(fm),τdO
(dI + dO)2
Λ(fm − pI(t)) (15)
pO(t+ 1) = pO(t) +
4αO(t)f ′|µ(fm),τdI
(dI + dO)2
Λ(fm − pO(t)) (16)
where Λi,i = λi,α
I and αO are the learn rates for in-class and out-of-class proto-
types, respectively, and τ is a time decay term [77]. f ′|µ(fm),τ is the first derivative
of the sigmoid loss function
f(µ(fm), τ) =
1
1 + e−τµ(fm)
(17)
where µ(fm) is the misclassification measure, defined as
µ(fm) = (
dI − dO
dI + dO
) (18)
Correct classification occurs if µ(fm) < 0, misclassification occurs if µ(fm) ≥ 0, and
µ(fm) = −1 corresponds to perfect classification [96].
To minimize potential divergence of the prototype vectors, GRLVQI implements
a conditional update rule under which the winning in-class and out-of-class proto-
type vectors are only updated if the input sample is misclassified; otherwise, only
the in-class prototype vector is updated [77].
After selecting pI and pO, the αI and αO learn rates are adjusted and the λi
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relevances adjusted using [45]
∆λi = −
2α(t)λf ′|µ(fm),τ
[
dO(fm − pI)]
(dI + dO)2
+
2α(t)λf ′|µ(fm),τ
[
dI(fm − pO)]
(dI + dO)2
(19)
The process of distorting prototype vectors and updating the relevances is repeated
for NI = 600 iterations, or until other termination criteria are satisfied. Follow-
ing termination, the output from the GRLVQI model training process includes the
following:
• prototype vectors representing the best fit model
• relevance rankings, λ, associated with best fit prototype vectors
The corresponding “best” Relevance Vector, given by
λB =
[
λ1, λ2, . . . , λNf
]
(20)
can be used for feature Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) as evaluated in
[66, 90–93, 102, 127]; however, this research effort did not consider the impact of
applying DRA to GRLVQI processing.
3.4.4 Matched Filter Template Generation.
The matched filter reference templates used for device discrimination (xAuth1,
xAuth2, xAuth3, etc...) and operation identification (xADD.B, xADDC.B, xAND.B, etc...) were
generated for each class by calculating the mean of NkTng = 800 TD training emis-
sions belonging to one of the k = 5 groups for kF-CV. Although the average power
of all collected emissions was normalized in a prior post-processing step, the process
of averaging NkTng = 800 normalized signals can produce a mean signal with a dif-
ferent average power. Therefore, the average power of the resulting mean signal was
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Figure 21. Mean of NkTng=800 training waveforms with normalized average power
used as a matched filter template for operation classification. The template shown
corresponds to the XOR.B operation and is representative of other operations.
also normalized so that all of the matched filter template waveforms would have the
same average power. Figure 21 shows NkTng = 800 emissions (grey) collected from
RogueA executing the XOR.B operation and the normalized mean waveform (black)
used as the matched filter template, xXOR.B.
3.5 Classification Evaluation
Classification performs a one-vs.-many comparison of an unknown test emission,
xTst, to NDevAuth = 8 device classes for device discrimination or NOp = 12 oper-
ation classes for operation identification. The classifier generates NC test statistic
values, zV , corresponding to how much a given test emission resembles each of the
NC possible classes. The class yielding the highest probability is chosen as the es-
timated device or operation for that test emission. To evaluate the performance of
each classification method, NTst × NDevAuth = 4000 × 8 = 32000 testing emissions
for device discrimination and NTst ×NOp = 4000× 12 = 48000 testing emissions for
operation identification were classified at all SNRA points using the models devel-
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oped at SNRA = 30 dB. The percent correct classification (%C) was calculated for
the individual classes as well as the average percent correct classification (%CAve)
achieved across all NC classes.
3.5.1 MDA/ML Classification.
Each RF-DNA fingerprint, F, is classified using MDA/ML by projecting the
fingerprint into MDA space using (10) and then computing a measure of similar-
ity comparing the projected fingerprint, FW, to each of the NC classes. As in [14],
the Bayesian posterior probability was used as the measure of similarity under the
assumptions of equal prior probabilities and uniform costs, an approach which op-
timally minimizes the classification error probability [121]. A projected fingerprint,
FW, is assigned to class wi where i ∈ {1, 2, ..., NC}
P (wi|FW) > P (wj|FW) ∀j 6= i (21)
where P (wi|FW) is the conditional posterior probability that FW belongs to class
wi. Using Baye’s Theorem, the conditional probabilities in (21) can be expressed as
P (wi|FW) = P (F
W|wi)P (wi)
P (FW)
(22)
Under the assumption of equal prior probabilities for all classes, P (wi) = 1/NC
remains constant in the numerator of (22). Similarly, the denominator remains con-
stant across all wi for a given fingerprint, F
W, and can be neglected when evaluat-
ing the relative probabilities in (21). Therefore, the decision criteria in (21) can be
reduced to maximizing the likelihood P (FW|wi) ∀ wi [14].
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3.5.2 GRLVQI Classification.
The GRLVQI classification process determines a one-vs.-many “best match”
with a minimum Euclidean distance metric that has been successfully used in pre-
vious research [45, 77, 90]. Each RF-DNA fingerprint, F, is declared as belonging to
class C according to
argmin
C

√√√√ Nf∑
i=1
λi
(
Fi − pn,Ci
)2 (23)
where Fi is the i
th feature of F, λi ∈ λ is the relevance ranking of the ith feature,
and n ∈ {1, 2, ..., NP} with pn,C being the nth prototype vector associated with
class model C.
3.5.3 Matched Filter Classification.
The matched filter classification process uses a bank of parallel matched filters
to evaluate an unknown test input, xTst, as illustrated in Figure 22 corresponding
to each of the (a) NDevAuth = 8 “authorized” device classes or (b) NOp = 12 Format
I operation classes. The output test statistics, zV , corresponding to each class are
compared and the matched filter which produced the largest zV value is chosen as
the estimated class, C, according to
argmax
C
(
N∑
k=0
xC [k]xTst[k]
)
(24)
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Figure 22. Bank of parallel matched filters used for (a) device discrimination and (b)
operation identification.
3.5.4 Confusion Matrices and Performance Curves.
Classification performance is evaluated based on percent correct classification
(%C), calculated for each class as the number of correctly classified test emissions
divided by the total number of test emissions evaluated for that class. For example,
using the representative confusion matrix in Table 12 with NC = 3 classes and
NTst = 4000 test emissions per class, the percent correct classification for class C1
is calculated as %C = 3801/4000 = 95.0%. Similarly, %C = 3602/4000 = 90.1% for
class C2 and %C = 3476/4000 = 86.9% for class C3.
Confusion matrices were generated at each evaluated SNRA to facilitate anal-
ysis of identification errors and have been included in Appendix B for the highest
evaluated SNRA = 30 dB. The %C values calculated from the confusion matrix at
each SNRA were plotted as a function of SNRA to produce the classification per-
formance curves presented in Chapter IV.
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Table 12. Representative confusion matrix for NC=3 classes with NTst=4000 test
emissions per class.
Declared Class
C1 C2 C3
C1 3801 127 72
C2 197 3602 201
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
C3 14 510 3476
3.6 Verification Evaluation
Verification performs a one-vs.-one comparison to determine how much a de-
vice “looks like” a claimed identity, similar to how a person’s identity is verified
through the use of an ID card. To protect against unauthorized “rogue” devices im-
personating authorized devices a verification threshold, tV , can be used to either
grant or deny system access to the device in question. For this research effort the
“rogue” devices represent counterfeit chips attempting to pass as authentic hard-
ware. In reality, all evaluated devices were genuine MSP-EXP430F5529 boards and
the NDevRogue = 2 boards selected to represent “rogue” devices where chosen be-
cause they came from a different manufacturing lot and have a different revision
MSP430 chip than the other NDevAuth = 8 boards representing “authentic” devices.
The MDA/ML, GRLVQI, and matched filtering classifier models are trained
using NTng = 1000 training emissions from the NDevAuth = 8 authorized devices as
previously described. The verification performance is then evaluated by presenting
NTst = 4000 previously “unevaluated” testing emissions from the NDevAuth = 8
authorized devices as well as NDevRogue = 2 rogue devices for verification.
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Table 13. Combinations of actual and claimed identities for device verification with
the corresponding outcomes and verification rates based on the accept/reject de-
cision. Correct decisions are highlighted in green and incorrect decisions are high-
lighted in red.
Actual
Identity
Claimed
Identity
Decision Outcome
Verification
Rate
AuthX AuthX Accepted True Verification TV R = 1− FRR
AuthX AuthX Rejected False Rejection FRR = 1− TV R
AuthY AuthX Accepted False Verification FV R = 1− TRR
AuthY AuthX Rejected True Rejection TRR = 1− FV R
RogueZ AuthX Accepted Rogue Acceptance RAR = 1−RRR
RogueZ AuthX Rejected Rogue Rejection RRR = 1−RAR
Performance is characterized using the verification rate values described in Ta-
ble 13. When an authorized device is presented for verification claiming its true
identity, the rate at which it is correctly verified and granted access is the True Ver-
ification Rate (TVR). The False Rejection Rate (FRR) is equivalent to 1 − TV R
and corresponds to when an authorized device claiming its true identity is incor-
rectly rejected and denied system access. The False Verification Rate (FVR) corre-
sponds to when an authorized device is presented for verification claiming the iden-
tity of a different authorized device and it is incorrectly granted access. When the
verification process correctly detects the identity mismatch and rejects the autho-
rized device claiming a different identity than its own, that corresponds to the True
Rejection Rate (TRR) which is equivalent to 1− FV R.
The rate at which a previously unevaluated “rogue” device is presented for ver-
ification claiming the identity of an authentic device and it is incorrectly accepted
is the Rogue Accept Rate (RAR). When the rogue device is correctly rejected that
corresponds to the Rogue Rejection Rate (RRR) which is equivalent to 1 − RAR.
The RAR and RRR metrics are used when attempting to verify rogue devices and
have similar meaning to the FVR and TRR metrics, respectively, which are used
when performing verification of authentic devices.
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This research effort did not perform a verification assessment for “rogue oper-
ations” as was done for rogue devices because a MCU can only execute operations
from a finite, known set. To verify that a MCU is executing the authorized pro-
gram, observed URE can be classified as originating from one of the possible oper-
ations associated with the authorized program. A sequence of estimated operations
can then be compared to the expected sequence of operations to detect anomalous
execution.
3.6.1 ROC Curve Generation.
Verification performance is documented using Receiver Operating Character-
istics (ROC) curves which illustrate the performance of a binary classifier (accep-
t/reject) as the decision threshold, tV , is varied. ROC curves are generated by plot-
ting TVR vs. FVR when evaluating verification of authorized devices and TVR vs.
RAR when evaluating the rejection of rogue devices. The TVR is calculated using
the Probability Mass Function (PMF) of zV values from the comparison of an au-
thentic device vs. its own identity (AuthX vs. AuthX ). A representative PMF for
an “A vs. A” comparison is shown in blue and red at the top of Figure 23a. The
verification threshold, tV , is varied across the range of PMF bins and the percent-
age of zV values that are accepted at a given tV value correspond to the TVR at
that threshold.
A similar process is used to calculate FVR from the PMF comparing other au-
thentic devices vs. the claimed identity (AuthY vs. AuthX ) and to calculate RAR
from the PMF comparing a rogue device vs. the claimed identity of an authen-
tic device (RogueZ vs. AuthX ). A representative PMF for “B vs. A” comparison
is shown in yellow and green at the bottom of Figure 23a. ROC curves having a
higher TVR and a lower FVR/RAR correspond to better performance. The point
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Figure 23. Representative (a) PMFs of test statistic, zV , values for “A vs. A”
(blue/red) and “B vs. A” (yellow/green) comparisons with (b) the corresponding
ROC curve for authorized device verification. The verification rate regions are color
coded with accepted zV values on the left side of tV and rejected zV values on the
right side of tV . The shown threshold, tV , corresponds to the EER.
at which the FRR is equivalent to the FVR/RAR is the Equal Error Rate (EER).
The EER provides a single metric with which to evaluate the verification process,
with a lower EER representing better performance [56].
3.7 Computational Time Evaluation
To compare the computational costs of the three classification methods, the ex-
ecution time was recorded for the three shaded process regions in Figure 24. These
three regions were selected for comparison because they represent portions of the
classification process that differ between the three methods. The steps to remove
DC bias, generate like-filtered AWGN, and normalize signal power were not con-
sidered for computational cost comparison because they are identical for all three
methods. The computational times presented in Chapter IV represent the elapsed
time to complete each processing region at a single SNRA. The times were recorded
while processing a “batch” of emissions as described in this section rather than a
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Figure 24. Block diagram highlighting the three process regions evaluated for com-
putational time: post collection signal processing (tProc), model development (tModel),
and model evaluation (tEval).
single emission because the time required to process a single emission was too small
to measure with useful accuracy in the Matlabr environment.
The signal processing (tProc) region of Figure 24 contains the method-specific
post-collection processing applied to the normalized signals. For the RF-DNA meth-
ods, post-collection processing (tProcRFDNA) includes the process of dividing the sig-
nal ROI into NSR sub-regions and calculating the statistical values for amplitude,
phase, and frequency to generate the RF-DNA fingerprint vector. For matched fil-
tering, the post-collection processing (tProcMF ) includes truncating signals at rising
and falling clock edges to be the same length. The execution time for the tProc re-
gion was evaluated to complete the processing of NB ×NDevAuth = 5000× 8 = 40000
emissions for device discrimination and NB × NOp = 5000 × 12 = 60000 emissions
for operation identification.
The model development (tModel) region of Figure 24 corresponds to the k-fold
model development phase using NTng = 1000 fingerprints/waveforms for each of
NDevAuth = 8 authorized devices or NOp = 12 operations. The MDA/ML model
development process (tModelMDAML) used a standard kF-CV process with k = 5 to
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generate a projection matrix. The GRLVQI model development process (tModelGRLV QI)
used a standard kF-CV process with k = 5 to generate prototype vectors. The
matched filtering model development process (tModelMF ) used a standard kF-CV
process with k = 5 to generate reference templates.
The model evaluation (tEval) region of Figure 24 corresponds to the performance
evaluation phase which uses the model developed for each classification method to
evaluate NTst × NDevAuth = 4000 × 8 = 32000 emissions for device discrimination
and NTst ×NOp = 4000× 12 = 48000 emissions for operation identification.
The “total computational time” was calculated as tTotalMDAML = tProcRFDNA +
tModelMDAML + tEvalMDAML for RF-DNA fingerprint generation and MDA/ML clas-
sification, tTotalGRLV QI = tProcRFDNA + tModelGRLV QI + tEvalGRLV QI for RF-DNA fin-
gerprint generation and GRLVQI classification, and tTotalMF = tProcMF + tModelMF +
tEvalMF for TD signal truncation and matched filtering classification.
When implementing these classification techniques in a real-world monitoring
system the time required for model development is of less importance because the
model is developed “oﬄine” using training emissions prior to system deployment.
The computational cost to process future observed URE and evaluate them with
the previously developed model provide a better representation of the computa-
tional cost in a real-time monitoring system. Therefore, an “alternative computa-
tional time” (tAltTotal = tProc + tEval) was also calculated using the corresponding
regions for each method which excluded the model development time, representing
an “as deployed” solution.
The execution times for each process region were recorded using the Matlabr
tic and toc functions. All processing was executed using Matlabr 2014b on a
desktop computer running Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise Edition 64-bit Oper-
ating System (OS) with 192 GB of RAM and dual Intel R© Xeon R© E5-2697 v2 pro-
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cessors (24-cores/48-threads total) clocked at 2.70 GHz. Since Windows is a non-
deterministic OS, all benchmark tests were repeated five times and the median time
was selected as the result to mitigate the impact of variations in the recorded time
due to OS process scheduling.
The execution time of a computer program is dependent on how it is imple-
mented. To make the comparison of execution time between classification methods
“fair,” efforts were made to make the software implementations for each method
similar where possible. The code used for the MDA/ML and GRLVQI model devel-
opment and evaluation was derived from the common body of Matlabr code used
for prior AFIT RF-DNA research whereas the matched filtering model development
and evaluation code was uniquely created for this effort. A custom RF-DNA fin-
gerprint generation program was used for this research which excluded the use of
the Matlabr parfor loops which were used in the existing RF-DNA fingerprint
code and mirrored the program structure used in the signal truncation routine for
matched filtering. This simpler program structure without parallel for loops is simi-
lar to what might be required to implement these algorithms in a deployed solution
using low-cost embedded hardware with limited processing power.
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IV. Results
This chapter provides research results for device classification in Section 4.1 and
operation classification in Section 4.2 which were generated using the methodology
described in Chapter III. Section 4.3 presents device ID verification results and Sec-
tion 4.4 compares the computational time required for each of the three evaluated
classification methods.
4.1 Device Classification
Average device classification performance (%CAve) across NC = NDevAuth = 8
authorized device classes is presented in Figure 25 using Radio-Frequency (RF) Dis-
tinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) features paired with Multiple Discriminant Anal-
ysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) classification, RF-DNA features paired with
Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantized-Improved (GRLVQI) classifica-
tion, and Time Domain (TD) signals with matched filtering classification. Confi-
dence intervals of CI = 95% were calculated and used to evaluate the statistical
significance of classification results; however, they have been omitted from plots to
improve visual clarity.
Using RF-DNA with MDA/ML resulted in average classification performance
%CAve ≥ 75.38% for SNRA ≥ 20 dB. Using RF-DNA with GRLVQI resulted in
average classification performance %CAve ≥ 60.85% for SNRA ≥ 20 dB. Using
matched filtering resulted in average classification performance %CAve ≥ 52.38%
for SNRA ≥ 20 dB. RF-DNA with MDA/ML had the best average classification
performance for SNRA ≥ 0 dB. However, matched filtering had the best average
classification performance for low Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of SNRA < 0 dB,
possibly due to its optimal performance in the presence of noise [89,99].
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Figure 25. Average device classification performance (%CAve) for NC=NDevAuth=8 de-
vices using RF-DNA with MDA/ML, RF-DNA with GRLVQI, and matched filtering
techniques to evaluate NTst=4000 testing emissions per device class. Confidence inter-
vals of CI=95% are approximately the same size or smaller than the marker shapes
and have been omitted for visual clarity. RF-DNA with MDA/ML achieved the best
performance of the techniques considered for SNRA≥0 dB.
Additional plots showing the device classification performance of individual de-
vice classes and the confusion matrices at SNRA = 30 dB for each classification
method are included in Appendix B, but have been omitted here for brevity. Ta-
ble 14 provides a comparison of the individual class results at the highest evalu-
ated SNRA = 30 dB and highlights the classes that achieved better than “random
guess” classification performance (%CRandom = 12.5%) for each method. All 8 de-
vices were classified with %C ≥ 12.5% for all three evaluated classification tech-
niques.
For all three classification methods, the Device Under Test (DUT) named “Auth1”
achieved the highest percent correct classification out of the NDevAuth = 8 eval-
uated devices. It is worth noting that Auth1 was the DUT used during the early
investigation portion of this research effort and had therefore spent many more
hours powered up and operating than the other DUTs. This research effort did not
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Table 14. Comparison of device classification performance for NC=NDevAuth=8 de-
vices using RF-DNA with MDA/ML, RF-DNA with GRLVQI, and matched filtering
techniques to evaluate NTst=4000 testing emissions per device class at SNRA=30 dB.
Cells are colored based on whether they are greater than (green) or less than (red)
“random guess” %CRandom=12.50%. RF-DNA with MDA/ML achieved the best per-
formance with %CAve=75.66%
RF-DNA w/
MDA/ML
RF-DNA w/
GRLVQI
Matched
Filtering
Auth1 97.40% 88.78% 71.75%
Auth2 77.35% 64.78% 59.63%
Auth3 78.78% 55.48% 31.18%
Auth4 71.28% 61.63% 56.80%
Auth5 80.73% 70.65% 62.25%
Auth6 61.96% 41.93% 43.20%
Auth7 80.83% 73.23% 33.00%
Auth8 56.95% 32.18% 61.78%
%CAve 75.66% 61.08% 52.45%
maintain formal device usage logs; however, as an estimate, Auth1 had at least two
months worth of non-consecutive lifetime usage whereas the other devices each had
less than 24 hours of non-consecutive lifetime usage prior to acquiring the Uninten-
tional RF Emissions (URE) used to generate the results presented here. As semi-
conductor devices age, internal changes such as electro-migration, time dependent
dielectric breakdown [87], and bias temperature instability [57, 71] alter a device’s
switching characteristics. The longer operating time of Auth1 may have influenced
its physical characteristics, and thus URE, in a way that made it “more unique”
and distinguishable from the other devices.
Another possible reason for the higher classification performance of Auth1 is
that it was a member of the set of devices (Auth1, Auth2, RogueA) used to deter-
mine the collection location for device discrimination as described in Section 3.2.
The influence of Auth1 in that collection location decision may have contributed to
its better performance. However, Auth2 was also part of the set used to determine
the collection location and its performance was near the middle of the NDevAuth = 8
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evaluated devices. If the device’s operational age impacted URE as previously sug-
gested, Auth2 would have been representative of the other devices (Auth3-8) which
had been used for a similar amount of time. Therefore, the process used to choose
a collection location may have selected the location that maximized the variance
between “old” devices (Auth1) and “young” devices (Auth2-8). The DUT named
“RogueA” was also included in the set of devices used to choose a collection loca-
tion; however, excluding it from the set did not change the chosen location which
maximized inter-device variance.
Table 15 contains the normalized cross-correlation (CX,Y ) of the NDevAuth = 8
reference templates used for matched filter device classification. This provides in-
sight into how much the template for each device class “looks like” the templates
for the other classes, with a lower value representing a greater difference and more
distinguishability between classes. The DUTs Auth7 and Auth8 looked the most
alike with a normalized cross-correlation CAuth7,Auth8 = 0.9879. The DUTs Auth1
and Auth5 were the most different from each other with a normalized cross-correlation
CAuth1,Auth5 = 0.8300. As expected due to its superior classification performance,
the template for Auth1 was the most unique by having the lowest average normal-
ized cross-correlation with other devices of CAve = 0.9077.
75
Table 15. Normalized cross-correlation (CX,Y) of matched filter reference templates
used for device classification of NC=NDevAuth=8 devices. Reference templates were
generated from NTng=1000 training emissions per device using standard k-fold cross-
validation with k=5.
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Auth1 1 .9363 .8608 .8536 .8300 .9346 .9747 .9636
Auth2 .9363 1 .9600 .9680 .9456 .9724 .9534 .9430
Auth3 .8608 .9600 1 .9720 .9861 .9395 .8875 .8661
Auth4 .8536 .9680 .9720 1 .9805 .9438 .8843 .8804
Auth5 .8300 .9456 .9861 .9805 1 .9344 .8635 .8456
Auth6 .9346 .9724 .9395 .9438 .9344 1 .9689 .9579
Auth7 .9747 .9534 .8875 .8843 .8635 .9689 1 .9879
Auth8 .9636 .9430 .8661 .8804 .8456 .9579 .9879 1
4.2 Operation Classification
Average operation classification performance (%CAve) across NC = NOp = 12
Format I operation classes is presented in Figure 26 for the RF-DNA with MDA/ML,
RF-DNA with GRLVQI, and matched filtering classification techniques. Confidence
intervals of CI = 95% were calculated and used to evaluate the statistical signif-
icance of classification results; however, they have been omitted from plots to im-
prove visual clarity.
Using RF-DNA with MDA/ML resulted in average classification performance
%CAve ≥ 10.73% for SNRA ≥ 20 dB. Using RF-DNA with GRLVQI resulted in
average classification performance %CAve ≥ 8.62% for SNRA ≥ 20 dB. Using
matched filtering resulted in average classification performance %CAve ≥ 11.09% for
SNRA ≥ 20 dB. Matched filtering had the best average classification performance
for all evaluated SNRA ∈ [−30, 30] dB.
Additional plots showing the operation classification performance of individual
operation classes and the confusion matrices at SNRA = 30 dB for each classifica-
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Figure 26. Average operation identification performance (%CAve) for NC=NOp=12
operations using RF-DNA with MDA/ML, RF-DNA with GRLVQI, and matched
filtering techniques to evaluate NTst=4000 testing emissions per operation class. Con-
fidence intervals of CI=95% are approximately the same size or smaller than the
marker shapes and have been omitted for visual clarity. Matched filtering achieved
the best performance of the techniques considered for SNRA ∈ [−30, 30] dB.
tion method are included in Appendix B, but have been omitted here for brevity.
Table 16 provides a comparison of the individual class results at the highest evalu-
ated SNRA = 30 dB and highlights the classes that achieved better than “random
guess” classification performance (%CRandom = 8.33%) for each method. Using RF-
DNA with MDA/ML, all 12 operations were classified with %C ≥ 8.33%. Using
RF-DNA with GRLVQI, 5 out of 12 operations were classified with %C ≥ 8.33%.
Using matched filtering, 3 out of 12 operations were classified with %C ≥ 8.33%.
There was not a single operation class that consistently achieved better classi-
fication performance than the other classes for all of the evaluated methods. RF-
DNA with MDA/ML achieved the best classification performance for BIT.B with
%C = 13.83%. RF-DNA with GRLVQI achieved the best classification performance
for SUBC.B with %C = 19.15%. Matched filtering achieved the best classification
performance for CMP.B with %C = 54.70%.
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Table 16. Comparison of operation classification performance for NC=NOp=12 opera-
tions using RF-DNA with MDA/ML, RF-DNA with GRLVQI, and matched filtering
techniques to evaluate NTst=4000 testing emissions per operation class at SNRA=30
dB. Cells are colored based on whether they are greater than (green) or less than
(red) “random guess” %CRandom=8.33%. Matched filtering achieved the best perfor-
mance with %CAve=11.10%
RF-DNA w/
MDA/ML
RF-DNA w/
GRLVQI
Matched
Filtering
ADD.B 12.25% 15.40% 1.90%
ADDC.B 11.7% 7.28% 0.78%
AND.B 12.78% 6.98% 0.73%
BIC.B 9.05% 3.98% 10.20%
BIS.B 13.68% 8.23% 1.70%
BIT.B 13.83% 3.20% 0.85%
CMP.B 8.68% 9.43% 54.70%
DADD.B 9.60% 5.18% 5.78%
MOV.B 9.40% 8.93% 50.33%
SUB.B 12.08% 9.15% 0.90%
SUBC.B 9.15% 19.15% 4.88%
XOR.B 9.55% 7.40% 0.50%
%CAve 10.98% 8.69% 11.10%
The classification performance for individual operations using RF-DNA with
MDA/ML and RF-DNA with GRLVQI did not have any apparent outliers and re-
mained within roughly 10% of the average classification performance. Matched fil-
tering had two outlier classes, CMP.B and MOV.B, that achieved roughly 40% better
than average classification while the remainder of the operations achieved below av-
erage performance. Examination of the confusion matrix for matched filtering in
Table 17 revealed that a significant number of test emissions belonging to the ten
lowest performing operation classes were incorrectly declared as CMP.B or MOV.B.
Figure 27 shows the NOp = 12 reference templates used for matched filter oper-
ation classification. At the macro level, shown in Figure 27a, the NOp = 12 refer-
ence templates appear to be nearly identical to each other. Closer inspection of the
waveform peaks, as shown in Figure 27b, revealed that the rising edge of the sec-
ond peak of the second half-clock cycle of the MOV.B operation occurred before the
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Table 17. Confusion matrix for operation classification of NC=NOp=12 operations
using matched filtering to evaluate NTst=4000 testing emissions per operation at
SNRA=30 dB.
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ADD.B 76 15 12 242 51 33 1438 153 1805 25 131 19
ADDC.B 89 31 28 313 77 32 1783 200 1218 26 184 19
AND.B 93 33 29 322 85 42 1911 226 1018 23 199 19
BIC.B 110 31 25 408 82 42 2184 228 620 30 215 25
BIS.B 76 24 36 299 68 41 1821 190 1214 31 182 18
BIT.B 77 31 22 372 77 34 1901 206 1024 32 198 26
CMP.B 91 24 29 389 87 41 2188 269 619 29 215 19
DADD.B 94 31 20 303 67 36 1783 231 1219 23 175 18
MOV.B 64 22 11 221 50 25 1303 137 2013 10 133 11
SUB.B 95 22 25 312 75 31 1984 199 1012 36 183 26
SUBC.B 98 23 22 362 92 41 2077 232 821 22 195 15
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XOR.B 93 17 15 314 69 38 1811 201 1209 27 186 20
other operations and the falling edge of the CMP.B occurred after the other opera-
tions. Additionally, MOV.B and CMP.B have the greatest amplitude at samples 505
and 506, respectively. Although Figure 27b only shows a single peak, this trend was
present on the other major peaks as well. To verify that the MOV.B and CMP.B oper-
ations were not “randomly” at the two extremes due to the specific set of training
emissions that was used, reference templates were also generated using the same
process with four other independent sets of NTng = 1000 training emissions per op-
eration, drawn from the group previously set aside as testing emissions. In all four
cases, the relative position of the peaks was similar to the templates generated with
original training set.
Since the templates for all NOp = 12 Format I operations had the same general
shape, as shown in Figure 27a, if the peaks for an unknown testing emission oc-
curred sooner than the peaks in the MOV.B template, possibly due to noise or clock
jitter, then that emission would likely achieve a higher correlation with the MOV.B
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Figure 27. Matched filter reference templates for NOp=12 operation classes show-
ing (a) the complete templates and (b) an expanded view of the second peak of the
second half-clock cycle.
template than with the others. Similarly, if the peaks for an unknown testing emis-
sion occurred later than the peaks in the CMP.B template then that emission would
likely achieve a higher correlation with the CMP.B template than with the others.
This potential bias towards the MOV.B and CMP.B operations due to their extreme
positions relative to the other templates may have contributed to higher classifica-
tion performance.
Table 18 contains the normalized cross-correlation (CX,Y ) of the NOp = 12 ref-
erence templates used for matched filter operation classification. The BIC.B and
CMP.B operations looked the most like each other with a normalized cross-correlation
of CBIC.B,CMP.B = 0.9999. The CMP.B and MOV.B operations were the most different
from each other with a normalized cross-correlation of CCMP.B,MOV.B = 0.9869.
The template for MOV.B had the lowest average normalized cross-correlation
CAve = 0.9933 and the template for ADD.B had the second lowest average normal-
ized cross-correlation CAve = 0.9953. As visible in Figure 27b, the MOV.B and ADD.B
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Table 18. Normalized cross-correlation (CX,Y) of matched filter reference templates
used for operation classification of NC=NOp=12 operations. Reference templates were
generated from NTng=1000 training emissions per operation using standard k-fold
cross-validation with k=5.
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ADD.B 1 .9974 .9956 .9905 .9968 .9953 .9901 .9977 .9997 .9948 .9938 .9970
ADDC.B .9974 1 .9997 .9978 .9999 .9996 .9975 .9999 .9957 .9995 .9992 .9999
AND.B .9956 .9997 1 .9990 .9998 .9999 .9988 .9996 .9934 .9999 .9998 .9998
BIC.B .9905 .9978 .9990 1 .9982 .9991 .9999 .9974 .9875 .9993 .9996 .9981
BIS.B .9968 .9999 .9998 .9982 1 .9998 .9980 .9998 .9950 .9996 .9994 .9999
BIT.B .9953 .9996 .9999 .9991 .9998 1 .9989 .9995 .9931 .9999 .9998 .9997
CMP.B .9901 .9975 .9988 .9999 .9980 .9989 1 .9972 .9869 .9992 .9995 .9979
DADD.B .9977 .9999 .9996 .9974 .9998 .9995 .9972 1 .9960 .9993 .9990 .9999
MOV.B .9997 .9957 .9934 .9875 .9950 .9931 .9869 .9960 1 .9924 .9913 .9952
SUB.B .9948 .9995 .9999 .9993 .9996 .9999 .9992 .9993 .9924 1 .9999 .9996
SUBC.B .9938 .9992 .9998 .9996 .9994 .9998 .9995 .9990 .9913 .9999 1 .9993
XOR.B .9970 .9999 .9998 .9981 .9999 .9997 .9979 .9999 .9952 .9996 .9993 1
templates were closely grouped together and separated from the other ten operation
templates which were also closely grouped. Even though the MOV.B and ADD.B re-
sembled each other with CMOV.B,ADD.B = 0.9997, their distance from the rest of the op-
eration templates gave them the lowest average cross-correlation. However, despite
having the second lowest average cross-correlation, the ADD.B operation achieved
poor matched filtering classification performance %C = 1.90%. This poor perfor-
mance of the ADD.B operation may be due to the previously mentioned matched
filter bias towards the MOV.B operation due to its earlier peak position.
4.3 Device ID Verification
Device verification results are presented using Receiver Operating Characteris-
tics (ROC) curves which were generated at the highest evaluated SNRA = 30 dB
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operating point using the process described in Section 3.6.1. The notation A:B is
used in the plot legends to indicate how much device A “looks like” device B, where
A is the actual identity and B is the claimed identity. The ROC curves for autho-
rized device verification represent how much each of the NDevAuth = 8 authorized
devices “looks like” itself (Auth:Auth). Rogue device rejection performance is pre-
senting using separate ROC curves comparing each of the NDevRogue = 2 “rogue”
devices to each of the NDevAuth = 8 authorized devices (Rogue:Auth), all of which
were actually authentic MSP-EXP430F5529 boards from differing manufacturing
lots representing “authorized” and “rogue” devices.
This research assessed ROC curves for authorized device verification to represent
“successful verification” using the benchmark of TV R > 90% and FV R < 10%,
which is equivalent to EER ≤ 10%. Similarly, the ROC curves for rogue device
rejection were assessed to represent “successful rejection” when TV R > 90% and
RAR < 10%. This EER ≤ 10% benchmark was used to maintain consistency with
prior Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) RF-DNA research efforts [102, 127],
allowing a comparison of results. The region corresponding to EER ≤ 10% in the
presented plots has been outlined with a red box. Solid ROC curve lines indicate
A:B pairs which met the benchmark of EER ≤ 10% and dashed lines indicate
A:B pairs which failed to meet the benchmark. Figure 28 shows an overlay of all
authorized device verification ROC curves using RF-DNA with MDA/ML (red),
RF-DNA with GRLVQI (green), and matched filtering (blue) for comparison.
The Equal Error Rate (EER) when verifying each authorized device is given
in Table 19 along with the average EERAve achieved across all NDevAuth = 8 au-
thorized device classes. Using RF-DNA with MDA/ML, one device was success-
fully verified with EER ≤ 10% and the average EER was EERAve = 16.23%.
Using RF-DNA with GRLVQI, none of the devices were successfully verified with
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Figure 28. Comparison of authorized device verification performance for NDevAuth=8
authentic devices using RF-DNA with MDA/ML, RF-DNA with GRLVQI, and
matched filtering techniques to evaluate NTst=4000 testing emissions per device at
SNRA=30 dB. The arbitrary benchmark of EER≤10%, outlined in the top-left corner,
was met by one device using RF-DNA with MDA/ML and one device using matched
filtering.
Table 19. Comparison of EER and average EERAve for authentic device verification
using RF-DNA with MDA/ML, RF-DNA with GRLVQI, and matched filtering tech-
niques. Results obtained from NTst=4000 emissions per device at SNRA=30 dB. Cells
corresponding to “successful verification” (EER≤10%) have been highlighted in green.
RF-DNA with MDA/ML achieved the best performance with an average EER of
EERAve=16.23%.
RF-DNA w/
MDA/ML
RF-DNA w/
GRLVQI
Matched
Filtering
Auth1:Auth1 4.91% 25.89% 5.28%
Auth2:Auth2 14.48% 31.39% 25.72%
Auth3:Auth3 15.37% 28.35% 17.22%
Auth4:Auth4 16.62% 39.35% 34.15%
Auth5:Auth5 14.74% 33.73% 31.60%
Auth6:Auth6 24.39% 41.93% 43.14%
Auth7:Auth7 15.52% 31.05% 59.32%
Auth8:Auth8 23.84% 44.78% 48.19%
Average 16.23% 34.56% 33.08%
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Figure 29. Normalized PMFs showing the distribution of test statistic zV values used
to evaluate authorized device verification with matched filtering for (a) Auth1, which
achieved the best performance with EER=5.28%, and (b) Auth7, which achieved the
worst performance with EER=59.32%. The shown thresholds, tV , correspond to the
EER with accepted zV values on the right side of tV and rejected zV values on the
left side.
EER ≤ 10% and the average EER was EERAve = 34.56%. Using matched filtering,
one device was successfully verified with EER ≤ 10% and the average EER was
EERAve = 33.08%.
Auth1 was the only device to be successfully verified with EER ≤ 10% and
it achieved the lowest EER of all NDevAuth = 8 for all three evaluated methods.
This remains consistent with the observation made during device classification that
Auth1 achieved the best classification performance, possibly because it had spent
more hours powered and operating than the other DUTs which may have influ-
enced its URE in a way that differentiated it from the other devices. The normal-
ized Probability Mass Functions (PMFs) in Figure 29a show the distribution of test
statistics using matched filtering to compare how much Auth1 “looks like” Auth1
and how much the other seven authorized DUTs “look like” Auth1. The PMFs for
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Auth1 verification are more distinguishable than the PMFs for Auth7 verification
shown in Figure 29b and only have a small amount of overlap at the EER thresh-
old.
The authorized device verification of Auth7 using matched filtering achieved
EER = 59.32% which is worse than “random guess” performance. As shown in
Section 4.1, Auth7 had the second lowest matched filtering device classification
performance of %C = 33.00% which means it was difficult to distinguish Auth7
from other devices. Figure 29b shows that the distribution of test statistics compar-
ing how much Auth7 “looks like” Auth7 exists completely within the range of test
statistics comparing how much the other seven authorized DUTs “look like” Auth7.
More test statistics in the Auth7 vs. Auth7 PMF exist on the left side of the EER
threshold and are therefore incorrectly rejected than exist on the right side of the
threshold.
Figure 30 shows an overlay of all rogue device rejection ROC curves for RogueA
and RogueB using RF-DNA with MDA/ML (red), RF-DNA with GRLVQI (green),
and matched filtering (blue) for comparison. The EER when presenting RogueA for
verification as an “authorized device” is given in Table 20 along with the average
EERAve achieved across all NDevAuth = 8 authorized device classes. Using RF-DNA
with MDA/ML, RogueA was successfully rejected when compared to three of the
authorized devices and EERAve = 14.17%. Using RF-DNA with GRLVQI, RogueA
was not successfully rejected when compared to any of the authorized devices and
EERAve = 31.53%. Using matched filtering, RogueA was successfully rejected when
compared to six of the authorized devices and EERAve = 4.81%.
The EER when presenting RogueB for verification as an “authorized device” is
given in Table 21 along with the average EERAve achieved across all NDevAuth = 8
authorized device classes. Using RF-DNA with MDA/ML, RogueB was successfully
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Figure 30. Comparison of rogue device rejection performance for a) RogueA and
b) RogueB using RF-DNA with MDA/ML, RF-DNA with GRLVQI, and matched
filtering techniques. Results obtained from NTst=4000 testing emissions per device at
SNRA=30 dB. The arbitrary benchmark of EER≤10%, outlined in the top-left cor-
ner, was met by three devices using RF-DNA with MDA/ML and six device using
matched filtering for RogueA, and it was met by two devices using RF-DNA with
MDA/ML and three devices using matched filtering for RogueB.
Table 20. Comparison of EER and average EERAve for rogue device rejection of
RogueA using RF-DNA with MDA/ML, RF-DNA with GRLVQI, and matched fil-
tering techniques. Results obtained from NTst=4000 emissions per device at SNRA=30
dB. Cells corresponding to “successful rejection” (EER≤10%) have been highlighted
in green. Matched filtering achieved the best performance with an average EER of
EERAve=4.81%.
RF-DNA w/
MDA/ML
RF-DNA w/
GRLVQI
Matched
Filtering
RogueA:Auth1 1.42% 14.60% 0.03%
RogueA:Auth2 28.14% 37.03% 0.05%
RogueA:Auth3 17.72% 30.25% 0.65%
RogueA:Auth4 2.16% 27.18% 3.30%
RogueA:Auth5 1.20% 25.45% 6.70%
RogueA:Auth6 13.98% 36.25% 1.55%
RogueA:Auth7 26.00% 39.13% 15.27%
RogueA:Auth8 22.72% 42.33% 10.95%
Average 14.17% 31.53% 4.81%
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Table 21. Comparison of EER and average EERAve for rogue device rejection of
RogueB using RF-DNA with MDA/ML, RF-DNA with GRLVQI, and matched fil-
tering techniques. Results obtained from NTst=4000 emissions per device at SNRA=30
dB. Cells corresponding to “successful rejection” (EER≤10%) have been highlighted
in green. RF-DNA with MDA/ML achieved the best performance with an average
EER of EERAve=18.40%.
RF-DNA w/
MDA/ML
RF-DNA w/
GRLVQI
Matched
Filtering
RogueB:Auth1 24.66% 37.25% 0.00%
RogueB:Auth2 7.10% 29.65% 9.85%
RogueB:Auth3 13.22% 29.48% 30.00%
RogueB:Auth4 23.20% 44.73% 39.68%
RogueB:Auth5 16.84% 37.48% 49.48%
RogueB:Auth6 31.24% 43.33% 25.93%
RogueB:Auth7 10.02% 27.00% 14.88%
RogueB:Auth8 20.94% 43.45% 4.60%
Average 18.40% 36.54% 21.80%
rejected when compared to one of the authorized devices and EERAve = 18.40%.
Using RF-DNA with GRLVQI, RogueB was not successfully rejected when com-
pared to any of the authorized devices and EERAve = 36.54%. Using matched fil-
tering, RogueB was successfully rejected when compared to three of the authorized
devices and EERAve = 21.80%.
RF-DNA with MDA/ML achieved the best performance (lowest average EER)
of the three evaluated techniques for authorized device verification and rogue device
rejection when presented with RogueB for verification. Matched filtering achieved
the best performance for rogue device rejection when presented with RogueA for
verification. RogueA achieved a lower average EER than RogueB for all three eval-
uated techniques. The MSP-EXP430F5529 boards for RogueA and RogueB came
from separate manufacturing lots which may have caused differences between the
devices which made RogueA more distinguishable from the NDevAuth = 8 “autho-
rized” DUTs than RogueB. It is also worth noting that RogueA was included in
the arbitrarily chosen set of devices (Auth1, Auth2, RogueA) used to determine the
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Table 22. Comparison to computational times to process NB=5000 emissions for each
of NDevAuth=8 devices, generate classification models, and evaluate device classifi-
cation performance using RF-DNA with MDA/ML, RF-DNA with GRLVQI, and
matched filtering. Results shown are median values obtained from NTrial=5 indepen-
dent trials for each scenario. All times are formatted as H:MM:SS.s.
RF-DNA w/
MDA/ML
RF-DNA w/
GRLVQI
Matched
Filtering
tProc
(%tProc)
0:52:13.6
(98.4%)
0:52:13.6
(23.3%)
0:15:34.9
(85.3%)
tModel
(%tModel)
0:00:38.8
(1.2%)
2:51:26.9
(76.6%)
0:02:20.0
(12.8%)
tEval
(%tEval)
0:00:11.5
(0.4%)
0:00:04.7
(0.04%)
0:00:21.4
(1.9%)
tTotal 0:53:04.0 3:43:43.2 0:18:15.8
probe location to collection URE for device discrimination. However, as mentioned
in Section 4.1, whether or not RogueA was included in that set of devices did not
change the resulting collection location chosen by the process.
4.4 Computational Time
The computational times required to complete the post-collection processing
(tProc), model development (tModel), and performance evaluation (tEval) are pre-
sented in Table 22 and Table 23 for device classification and operation classifica-
tion, respectively. The results presented in this chapter were produced as described
in Section 3.7 and represent the median observed time out of NTrial = 5 indepen-
dent trials for each scenario. The complete record of observed times from all trials
is included in Appendix B, but has been omitted here for brevity.
The total time (tTotal) presented in Table 22 and Table 23 was calculated as the
sum of the three processing regions for each classification method using tTotal =
tProc + tModel + tEval. The percentage of tTotal that was required for each processing
region is also included in parentheses. For example, the percent of time required for
post-collection processing (%tProc) was calculated as %tProc = 100× tProc/tTotal.
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Table 23. Comparison to computational times to process NB=5000 emissions for each
of NOp=12 operations, generate classification models, and evaluate operation classi-
fication performance using RF-DNA with MDA/ML, RF-DNA with GRLVQI, and
matched filtering. Results shown are median values obtained from NTrial=5 indepen-
dent trials for each scenario. All times are formatted as H:MM:SS.s.
RF-DNA w/
MDA/ML
RF-DNA w/
GRLVQI
Matched
Filtering
tProc
(%tProc)
0:05:32.8
(96.1%)
0:05:32.8
(33.6%)
0:00:03.1
(12.4%)
tModel
(%tModel)
0:00:08.0
(2.3%)
0:10:56.9
(66.4%)
0:00:18.3
(73.6%)
tEval
(%tEval)
0:00:05.5
(1.6%)
0:00:00.2
(0.02%)
0:00:03.5
(14.0%)
tTotal 0:05:46.4 0:16:56.1 0:00:24.9
The computational times for device classification are compared in Table 22 for
each of the three classification methods. The majority of the time required for RF-
DNA with MDA/ML classification was spent processing the collected emissions
to generate RF-DNA fingerprints. The majority of the time required for RF-DNA
with GRLVQI classification was spent during the model development phase to gen-
erate prototype vectors. The majority of the time required for matched filtering
classification was spent processing the collected TD signals to truncate them at
rising and falling clock edges. RF-DNA with GRLVQI classification required the
greatest total time, taking roughly 4 times longer than RF-DNA with MDA/ML
and 12 times longer than matched filtering.
The computational times for operation classification are compared in Table 23
for each of the three classification methods. The majority of the time required for
RF-DNA with MDA/ML classification was spent processing the collected emissions
to generate RF-DNA fingerprints. The majority of the time required for RF-DNA
with GRLVQI classification was spent during the model development phase to gen-
erate prototype vectors. The majority of the time required for matched filtering
classification was spent during the model development phase to generate reference
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Table 24. Comparison of alternative computational times (tAltTotal=tProc+tEval) using
RF-DNA with MDA/ML, RF-DNA with GRLVQI, and matched filtering techniques
for device and operation classification. All times are formatted as H:MM:SS.s.
RF-DNA w/
MDA/ML
RF-DNA w/
GRLVQI
Matched
Filtering
Device Classification 0:52:25.2 0:52:18.4 0:15:56.2
Operation Classification 0:05:38.4 0:05:33.0 0:00:06.6
waveform templates. RF-DNA with GRLVQI classification required the greatest to-
tal time, taking nearly 3 times longer than RF-DNA with MDA/ML and 42 times
longer than matched filtering.
When considering the “alternative computational times” (tAltTotal = tProc+ tEval)
presented in Table 24, matched filtering outperformed both of the RF-DNA based
classification methods with the lowest tAltTotal time for device and operation classi-
fication. For device classification the RF-DNA techniques required roughly 3 times
more tAltTotal to complete than matched filtering and for operation classification the
RF-DNA techniques required roughly 50 times more tAltTotal than matched filter-
ing.
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V. Conclusion
This chapter provides a summary of research activities and results comparing:
1) Radio-Frequency (RF) Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) features paired
with Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) classifi-
cation, 2) RF-DNA features paired with Generalized Relevance Learning Vector
Quantized-Improved (GRLVQI) classification, and 3) Time Domain (TD) signals
with matched filtering classification for the purposes of device discrimination and
operation identification based on Unintentional RF Emissions (URE) from Micro-
Controller Units (MCUs). Section 5.1 provides a summary of the research motiva-
tion and goals for this effort. Section 5.1.1 and Section 5.1.2 summarize the classifi-
cation and verification performance, respectively, as presented in Chapter IV using
each of the three evaluated techniques. This chapter concludes with future research
recommendations in Section 5.2 for continued investigation and improvement of the
methods demonstrated in this work.
5.1 Research Summary
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are an integral
part of critical military and civilian infrastructures around the world and are there-
fore a prime target for cyber attack. In the past decade, hackers have compromised
SCADA systems to inflict physical damage and shutdown targets including nuclear
centrifuges [131], steel mills [132], and city power grids [75]. The growing threat of
cyber attack against critical infrastructure in the United States motivated President
Obama to issue Executive Order 13636 with the goal of “improving critical infras-
tructure cybersecurity” [84].
One serious threat to the security and reliability of systems performing critical
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functions is the presence of counterfeit hardware in the supply chain [106]. Driven
by the desire for cheaper electronic components, most Integrated Circuit (IC) man-
ufacturers have outsourced the fabrication of semiconductor devices to Asian coun-
tries with a low cost of labor which raises concerns regarding the authenticity of
devices [1]. Reports of counterfeit hardware have increased four fold from 2009 to
2011 [54] and counterfeit hardware has been discovered in systems ranging from
common network routers to high-altitude missile computers [40]. This reliance on
foreign semiconductor suppliers creates the opportunity for malicious hardware Tro-
jans to be implanted in devices [85]. Techniques to identify and authenticate semi-
conductor devices are necessary to prevent counterfeit components and hardware
Trojans from entering the supply chain for critical systems.
The goal of the device discrimination aspect of this research was to compare
the effectiveness of three techniques to classify and verify the identity of individ-
ual MCU devices that could be applied to detect counterfeit or Trojan hardware.
RF-DNA fingerprints paired with the MDA/ML and GRLVQI classifiers have been
used in prior Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) research to classify devices
from URE [14–16, 25, 26, 100–105, 127–129]. This research effort also evaluated TD
signals with matched filtering for device discrimination as a computationally sim-
pler alternative to the established RF-DNA techniques.
In additional to guarding against counterfeit and Trojan hardware, it is im-
portant to defend critical system against software vulnerabilities and exploitation.
Modern worms and viruses, such as the infamous Stuxnet virus, may take advan-
tage of previously unknown “zero-day” vulnerabilities to infect SCADA systems
and then hide their existence from the operator by reporting a false status while
performing nefarious deeds [112]. Modern methods for detecting unauthorized ac-
tivity on information systems focus on analyzing data within the upper Applica-
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tion (level 1) and Network (level 5) layers of the 7-layer Open Systems Intercon-
nect (OSI) model. Virus detection methods often rely on definitions derived from
previously seen malware and would therefore not be able to detect zero-day ex-
ploits. Additionally, these detection methods require processing resources beyond
normal operation which is problematic for many fielded systems due to the limited
on-board computing resources of the embedded processors used in Programmable
Logic Controller (PLC) devices [102].
The goal of the operation identification aspect of this research was to compare
the effectiveness of three techniques to estimate the individual operations executed
by a MCU from URE. The series of estimated operation could be compared with
the authorized program to verify the device execution. The MDA/ML and GR-
LVQI classifiers with RF-DNA fingerprints that have been established as successful
methods for device discrimination where also evaluated for operation identification.
However, due to their high computational cost, the RF-DNA methods are not well
suited for implementation in embedded systems with limited processing resources.
Therefore, matched filtering with TD signals is also considered as a potential alter-
native to the RF-DNA techniques due to its relatively low computational cost.
The MSP430F5529 16-bit MCU manufactured by Texas Instruments [117] was
selected as the Device Under Test (DUT) for this research because it is widely used
and representative of modern MCU architecture and semiconductor manufactur-
ing processes [119]. URE were collected from the DUT using a high-sensitivity RF
near-field probe with a Teledyne LeCroy WavePro 760Zi-A oscilloscope sampling
at a rate of fS = 1 Gsps. The collected emissions were then processed using Mat-
labr to develop classification models and evaluate their performance for each of the
three techniques. Section 5.1.1 presents a summary of the performance for device
and operation classification and the required computational cost using each of the
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evaluated techniques. Section 5.1.2 summarizes the authorized device verification
and rogue device rejection performance achieved using each technique.
5.1.1 Classification Performance.
Table 25 provides a summary of the classification results presented in Section 4.1,
Section 4.2, and Section 4.4. The classification performance values represent the
average percent correct classification (%CAve) achieved at the highest evaluated
SNRA = 30 dB. The computational time values represent the “alternative compu-
tational time” (tAltTotal = tProc + tEval) which excludes the model development time,
representing an “as deployed” solution. While an actual deployed system might ac-
quire, process, and evaluate emissions on an individual basis, the times shown here
represent the computational time to process a “batch” of emissions as described in
Section 3.7 because the time required to process individual emissions could not be
measured with reasonable accuracy in the Matlabr environment. The implemen-
tation of the classification techniques in a deployed solution would likely differ from
the Matlabr implementation used in this research; however, these times provide
an initial way to compare the relative computational cost of the three techniques.
Table 25. Summary of the classification performance (%CAve at SNRA=30 dB) and
computational time (tAltTotal=tProc+tEval) using RF-DNA with MDA/ML, RF-DNA
with GRLVQI, and matched filtering techniques for device and operation classifica-
tion. Cells are colored according to the relative performance of the three methods
with green representing the best, yellow the middle, and red the worst performance.
RF-DNA w/
MDA/ML
RF-DNA w/
GRLVQI
Matched
Filtering
Device Classification
Performance
75.66% 61.08% 52.45%
Operation Classification
Performance
10.98% 8.69% 11.10%
Device Classification
Computational Time
0:52:25.2 0:52:18.4 0:15:56.2
Operation Classification
Computational Time
0:05:38.4 0:05:33.0 0:00:06.6
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For device classification, RF-DNA with MDA/ML provided the best perfor-
mance, RF-DNA with GRLVQI was second best, and matched filtering was the
lowest. It is not surprising that both RF-DNA techniques out-performed matched
filtering for device classification since they were developed for that purpose through
prior research; however, the RF-DNA techniques did not perform as well here as
they have in other AFIT research efforts. For example, prior research using MDA/ML
classification with RF-DNA fingerprints successfully classified 40 near-identical PIC
MCUs with a correct identification rate of better than 90% for SNRA ≥ 15 dB [14].
The benchmark of percent correct classification %C ≥ 90% has been used in previ-
ous AFIT RF-DNA to represent “successful classification” [14, 90, 127]. Although
none of the evaluated techniques achieved an average percent correct classifica-
tion of %CAve ≥ 90%, Auth1 did surpass the benchmark with %C = 97.40% at
SNRA = 30 dB using RF-DNA with MDA/ML. As previously described in Sec-
tion 4.1, the URE from Auth1 had characteristics that made it more unique and
distinguishable from the other devices, possibly related to Auth1 having spent more
time powered up and operating than the other evaluated DUTs.
There are several potential factors that may have contributed to the lower clas-
sification performance of the RF-DNA techniques in this research compared to prior
efforts. The process used by Texas Instruments to manufacture MSP430 MCUs
might not produce as much variation between devices as the process used by Mi-
crochip Technology to manufacture the PIC MCUs used in previous RF-DNA re-
search [14], thus making it more difficult to discriminate between individual MSP430
devices. Additionally, in this research effort factors such as probe placement and
post-collection signal processing steps were chosen to maximize the matched filter-
ing classification performance rather than the RF-DNA performance. Future re-
search should consider the positive and negative impacts of those process decisions.
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For operation classification, matched filtering provided the best performance,
RF-DNA with MDA/ML was second best, and RF-DNA with GRLVQI had the
lowest performance – barely exceeding “random guess” accuracy. This poor per-
formance was unsatisfactory and would not be useful for real-world applications.
It was significantly lower than the operation identification performance achieved in
previous Side Channel Analysis (SCA) for Reverse Engineering (SCARE) research
efforts. For example, a prior SCARE effort analyzing the power consumption of an
8-bit ATMega163 MCU claimed to achieve 100% correct classification when iden-
tifying 39 commonly used instructions [81, 82]. Another effort analyzing URE from
a decapsulated 8-bit PICF687 MCU achieved instruction recognition rates up to
96.24% [108]. There were multiple aspects of the current research effort that made
the task of operation identification more difficult than in previous SCARE research.
1. The 16-bit MSP430 MCU has a more complex architecture and instruction
set than simple 8-bit ATMega and PIC MCUs. The NOp = 12 evaluated
MSP430 operations execute in a single clock cycle whereas the 8-bit PIC MCU
operations have a duration of four clock cycles, providing a longer period for
observation.
2. One goal of this research was to use a non-contact, non-destructive method
to collect side-channel information for analysis. Power consumption is a com-
monly used side-channel for SCARE; however, it requires contact measure-
ment of the DUT power supply and was therefore not used. Additionally,
since this research effort did not decapsulate the DUT as in previous URE-
based SCARE [108], it was not possible to achieve the same close and precise
positioning of the near-field probe over specific circuit elements.
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Figure 31. Sequence of URE collected from an Allen Bradley PLC executing a ladder
logic program [102].
3. Executing the NOp = 12 Format I operations produced URE which were dif-
ficult to distinguish between because they had a nearly identical signal shape.
Other types of devices may produce operation-dependent URE which is more
unique. For example, Figure 31 shows that the individual ladder logic instruc-
tion executed on a PLC for previous Correlation-Based Anomaly Detection
(CBAD) research are visibly recognizable from the URE [102].
The combination of these additional factors increased the complexity of the cur-
rent research and contributed to the significantly lower performance compared to
previous efforts. Future research evaluating RF-DNA and matched filtering tech-
niques for operation identification should scale back the aforementioned factors by
using a simpler DUT or different side-channels that provide better differentiation
between operations.
The computational time comparison in Table 25 shows that it takes significantly
less time to process and evaluate URE with matched filtering classification than
with the RF-DNA based classification technique. These results suggest that matched
filtering may serve as a computationally low cost alternative to the complex RF-
DNA fingerprint generation, MDA/ML, and GRLVQI algorithms if its classification
performance can be improved to meet application requirements.
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5.1.2 Verification Performance.
Table 26 provides a summary of the verification results presented in Section 4.3.
The successful verification and successful rejection numbers represent the number of
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curves that achieved the EER ≤ 10%
benchmark for each scenario. The EERAve values represent the average EER of
the NAuthDev = 8 ROC curves for each scenario.
Table 26. Summary of the number of successes (EER≥10%) and average EERAve for
authentic device verification and rogue device rejection performance using RF-DNA
with MDA/ML, RF-DNA with GRLVQI, and matched filtering techniques. Cells
are colored according to the relative performance of the three methods with green
representing the best, yellow the middle, and red the worst performance. All results
were evaluated at SNRA=30 dB.
RF-DNA w/
MDA/ML
RF-DNA w/
GRLVQI
Matched
Filtering
Authorized Device
Successful Verification
1 of 8 0 of 8 1 of 8
RogueA Device
Successful Rejection
3 of 8 0 of 8 6 of 8
RogueB Device
Successful Rejection
1 of 8 0 of 8 3 of 8
Authorized Device
Verification EERAve
16.23% 34.56% 33.08%
RogueA Device
Rejection EERAve
14.17% 31.53% 4.81%
RogueB Device
Rejection EERAve
18.40% 36.54% 21.80%
Both RF-DNA with MDA/ML and matched filtering techniques were able to
successfully verify one out of eight authentic devices and reject a rogue device com-
pared to at least one out of the eight authentic devices. RF-DNA with GRLVQI
was not able to successfully verify or reject any authentic or rogue devices. Consid-
ering that matched filtering had the lowest device classification performance of the
three techniques, it was surprising that matched filtering successfully accepted/re-
jected more authentic/rogue devices than either of the RF-DNA based techniques.
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Additionally, matched filtering was the only technique that achieved an average
Equal Error Rate (EER) of EERAve ≤ 10% which occurred when evaluating rogue
device rejection with RogueA. However, it is worth noting that the ROC curves
for authentic device verification and rogue device rejection using matched filtering
spanned a wider range of EERs than either of the RF-DNA based techniques. For
example, the EERs when evaluating RogueB with matched filtering ranged from
EER = 0.00% for RogueB:Auth1 to EER = 49.48% for RogueB:Auth5 – more
than twice the EER range of the other methods. Therefore, despite appearing to
be the best verification technique based on the number of “successful” verifications
and rejections, the inconsistent performance of matched filtering in terms of EER
makes it a less desirable technique compared to RF-DNA with MDA/ML.
5.2 Future Research Recommendations
The classification and verification results presented here had much lower per-
formance than previous related efforts and leaves significant room for improvement,
especially for operation identification. Despite the poor operation classification per-
formance achieved in this research effort, the fact that average percent correct clas-
sification was better than “random guess” for all three techniques suggests that
there is characteristic signal content in URE that can be used to differentiate op-
erations. The following recommendations are for related research avenues that war-
rant additional investigation to improve performance.
1. Improve URE Collection Process: There are several improvements that could
be made to the acquisition system and collection process used in this research
to further reduce to impact of noise and collection bias. Performing the col-
lections in a temperature controlled anechoic chamber would reduce envi-
ronmental noise. Additionally, powering the DUT from a DC power supply
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rather than the USB cable would remove the possibility of noise from the
computer affecting the DUT. Since each DUT was mounted on its own MSP-
EXP430F5529 board, differences between those boards could have influenced
the URE for this research. It would be better to use a single board for all col-
lections with a Zero Insertion Force (ZIF) socket that allows just the DUT
chip to be changed. Using a high quality external source to clock the DUT
would reduce the impact of clock jitter. Finally, a larger set of devices and
operations should be evaluated to determine the optimal location for URE
collection. It was not realized until the end of this research effort that the
“most unique” device, Auth1, was one of the three that had been arbitrarily
used to choose the collection location.
2. Study Impact of Device Age on URE: This research effort did not maintain
device usage logs that would be necessary to provide formal analysis, but the
observations about Auth1 and its distinguishability suggest that future re-
search into the effects of device usage on URE may be worthwhile.
3. Optimize Processing for RF-DNA: For this analysis, several factors such as
probe placement and post-collection signal processing were chosen to opti-
mize matched filtering performance. Using a different probe location or addi-
tional post-collection processing steps such as a Band Pass Filter (BPF), Dig-
ital Down Conversion (DDC), and/or Hilbert Transform (HT) may improve
the classification and verification performance using RF-DNA based tech-
niques. Shifting the location of the RF-DNA subregion so they do not match
the clock boundaries may improve performance. Also, it may be beneficial to
use subregions that are smaller than half clock periods to focus on “higher
activity” portions of the signal, especially when evaluating short, single cycle
operations.
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4. Consider Alternative Operation “Classes”: The NOp = 12 operation classes
considered for this research were all Format I instructions using register-to-
register addressing; however, it is possible to define the classes in other ways.
For example, the classes could be grouped based on the addressing modes
(register-to-register, register-to-memory, etc...) or by the Hamming weights
of the opcodes and/or operands. Future research should consider alternative
class groupings that are more distinguishable from each other to provide bet-
ter classification performance for operation identification.
5. Prior Probabilities for Operation Identification: This research effort assumed
an equal prior probability, Pi, for all device and operation classes to maintain
consistency with prior AFIT RF-DNA work. While that assumption made
sense for this research because all classes were represented equally, in real-
world code certain operations tend to appear more frequently than others.
Using code profiling and compiler statistics to adjust the prior probabilities
for operation classes may improve the operation identification performance
when analyzing real-world code segments.
6. Consider Preceding/Succeeding Operations: The operations immediately pre-
ceding and succeeding the operation of interest can potentially influence the
URE during its execution. It may be beneficial to create sub-classes of oper-
ations which considers the preceding and succeeding instructions, similar to
the grouping process used for Constellation-Based Distinct Native Attributes
(CB-DNA) which was based on preceding and succeeding symbol estima-
tions [12].
7. Decision Tree for Multi-Cycle Operation Identification: The NOp = 12 Format
I operations analyzed here used the register-to-register addressing mode and
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therefore had an effective duration of one clock cycle. However, the MSP430
has operations and addressing modes which range in execution time from one
to six clock cycles. To determine the duration of an unknown operation from
observed URE it may be necessary to use a decision tree that makes a logical
conclusion about the duration of the operation based on certain signal charac-
teristics.
8. Classify Operation Sequences: This research effort attempted to identify indi-
vidual MCU operations, effectively reverse-engineering the executed program.
Rather than attempting to classify individual instructions it may be beneficial
to create classes that represent common sequences of operations which can ex-
clude any impossible (or unlikely) operation sequences. This approach could
take advantage of hidden Markov chains to adjust model probabilities based
on observed sequences as done in previous SCARE research efforts [107].
9. Consider the Effect of Data Values: The program sequences used here for op-
eration identification removed the impact of data values on URE by initial-
izing all of the registers and operands to zero. As demonstrated by prior re-
search [39] and early experiments [100], the Hamming weight and Hamming
distance of consecutive instructions and data values can have a characteristic
effect on URE. Future research should continue to investigate the effects of
data on URE to determine if it is possible to identify both an executed opera-
tion and the processed values.
10. Clock Edge Alignment from URE: One way that this research effort differenti-
ated itself from prior SCARE research is that it used a non-contact RF probe
to collect URE. However, due to the observed clock jitter, a contact probe
was also used in this effort to record the Master CLocK (MCLK) to facilitate
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signal alignment. Future research should evaluate the effectiveness of using
signal processing techniques to align clock edges based solely on the observed
URE to avoid the need for the additional contact probe.
11. Hardware Implementation of Matched Filtering: One of the main reasons for
evaluating the relatively simple correlation-based matched filtering process as
an alternative to algorithms like MDA/ML and GRLVQI was that correla-
tion is well suited to implementation in realtime, inexpensive hardware [102].
The Matlabr based matched filtering implementation used in this research
out performed both RF-DNA techniques in regards to computational time.
A Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) based implementation of the
matched filtering classification process would serve as a proof-of-concept to
demonstrate its speed and performance using custom hardware. Similarly, a
MCU based matched filtering implementation would demonstrate its applica-
bility to use in low-cost, embedded processors.
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Appendix A. MSP430 Format I Instructions
Table 27. MSP430 Source and Destination Addressing Modes [118].
Addressing
Mode
Syntax Description
Register Rn Register contents are operand.
Indexed X(Rn)
(Rn + X) points to the operand. X is stored in the
next word, or stored in combination of the precending
extension word and the next word.
Symbolic ADDR
(PC + X) points to the operand. X is stored in the
next word, or stored in combination of the preced-
ing extension word and the next word. Indexed mode
X(PC) is used.
Absolute &ADDR
The word following the instruction contains the abso-
lute address. X is stored in the next word, or stored in
combination of the preceding extension word and the
next word. Indexed mode X(SR) is used.
Indirect
Register
@Rn Rn is used as a pointer to the operand.
Indirect
Autoincrement
@Rn+
Rn is used as a pointer to the operand. Rn is incre-
mented afterwards by 1 for .B instructions.
Immediate #N
N is stored in the next word, or stored in combination
of the preceding extension word and the next word.
Indirect autoincrement mode @PC+ is used.
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Appendix B. Additional Results
This appendix contains additional result data that was not presented in Chap-
ter IV including the computational times observed for each of the independent tri-
als, the classification performance plots and confusion matrices for the individual
device and operation classes, and separate verification performance receiver operat-
ing characteristics (ROC) curves for each of the three evaluated methods.
Table 28. Computational times to generate NB=5000 RF-DNA fingerprints for each
of NDevAuth=8 devices, generate the MDA/ML projection matrix using standard k=5
kF-CV with NTng=1000 training fingerprints per device, and evaluate the MDA/ML
classification performance using NTst=4000 testing fingerprints per device. All times
are formatted as H:MM:SS.s.
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Median
tProc 0:55:04.3 0:54:29.9 0:52:11.6 0:50:35.2 0:52:13.6 0:52:13.6
tModel 0:00:41.5 0:00:38.8 0:00:38.6 0:00:38.8 0:00:38.9 0:00:38.8
tEval 0:00:11.7 0:00:11.5 0:00:11.5 0:00:11.7 0:00:11.4 0:00:11.5
tTotal 0:55:57.4 0:55:20.2 0:53:01.7 0:51:25.7 0:53:04.0 0:53:04.0
Table 29. Computational times to generate NB=5000 RF-DNA fingerprints for each of
NDevAuth=8 devices, generate GRLVQI prototype vectors using standard k=5 kF-CV
with NTng=1000 training fingerprints per device, and evaluate the GRLVQI classi-
fication performance using NTst=4000 testing fingerprints per device. All times are
formatted as H:MM:SS.s.
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Median
tProc 0:55:04.3 0:54:29.9 0:52:11.6 0:50:35.2 0:52:13.6 0:52:13.6
tModel 2:51:33.4 2:52:20.1 2:51:26.6 2:51:07.4 2:51:21.9 2:51:26.6
tEval 0:00:04.7 0:00:04.3 0:00:05.0 0:00:05.2 0:00:04.7 0:00:04.7
tTotal 3:46:42.3 3:46:54.3 3:43:43.2 3:41:47.8 3:43:40.3 3:43:43.2
105
Table 30. Computational times to process and truncate NB=5000 emissions for each
of NDevAuth=8 devices, generate matched filter reference templates using standard
k=5 kF-CV with NTng=1000 training waveforms per device, and evaluate the matched
filter classification performance using NTst=4000 testing waveforms per device. All
times are formatted as H:MM:SS.s.
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Median
tProc 0:15:32.5 0:15:35.1 0:15:34.5 0:15:37.9 0:15:34.9 0:15:34.9
tModel 0:02:20.2 0:02:20.4 0:02:19.9 0:02:20.0 0:02:19.3 0:02:20.0
tEval 0:00:21.0 0:00:21.4 0:00:21.4 0:00:21.5 0:00:21.1 0:00:21.4
tTotal 0:18:13.7 0:18:16.8 0:18:15.8 0:18:19.4 0:18:15.3 0:18:15.8
Table 31. Computational times to generate NB=5000 RF-DNA fingerprints for each of
NOp=12 operations, generate the MDA/ML projection matrix using standard k=5 kF-
CV with NTng=1000 training fingerprints per operation, and evaluate the MDA/ML
classification performance using NTst=4000 testing fingerprints per operation. All
times are formatted as H:MM:SS.s.
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Median
tProc 0:05:59.0 0:06:02.9 0:05:32.8 0:05:22.5 0:05:31.1 0:05:32.8
tModel 0:00:08.0 0:00:07.9 0:00:08.0 0:00:08.2 0:00:08.2 0:00:08.0
tEval 0:00:05.6 0:00:05.6 0:00:05.5 0:00:05.5 0:00:05.5 0:00:05.5
tTotal 0:06:12.6 0:06:16.4 0:05:46.4 0:05:36.1 0:05:44.8 0:05:46.4
Table 32. Computational times to generate NB=5000 RF-DNA fingerprints for each of
NOp=12 operations, generate GRLVQI prototype vectors using standard k=5 kF-CV
with NTng=1000 training fingerprints per operation, and evaluate the GRLVQI classi-
fication performance using NTst=4000 testing fingerprints per operation. All times are
formatted as H:MM:SS.s.
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Median
tProc 0:05:59.0 0:06:02.9 0:05:32.8 0:05:22.5 0:05:31.1 0:05:32.8
tModel 0:10:56.9 0:11:08.7 0:10:46.1 0:10:24.5 0:11:35.4 0:10:56.9
tEval 0:00:00.2 0:00:00.2 0:00:00.2 0:00:00.2 0:00:00.2 0:00:00.2
tTotal 0:16:56.1 0:17:11.8 0:16:19.1 0:15:47.2 0:17:06.7 0:16:56.1
Table 33. Computational times to process and truncate NB=5000 emissions for each
of NOp=12 operations, generate matched filter reference templates using standard k=5
kF-CV with NTng=1000 training waveforms per operation, and evaluate the matched
filter classification performance using NTst=4000 testing waveforms per operation. All
times are formatted as H:MM:SS.s.
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Median
tProc 0:00:03.0 0:00:03.1 0:00:03.1 0:00:03.2 0:00:03.1 0:00:03.1
tModel 0:00:18.3 0:00:18.5 0:00:18.3 0:00:18.3 0:00:18.3 0:00:18.3
tEval 0:00:03.5 0:00:03.5 0:00:03.5 0:00:03.5 0:00:03.5 0:00:03.5
tTotal 0:00:24.8 0:00:25.0 0:00:24.9 0:00:25.0 0:00:24.9 0:00:24.9
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Figure 32. Device classification performance for NC=NDevAuth=8 devices using RF-
DNA with MDA/ML to evaluate NTst=4000 testing fingerprints per device class.
Confidence intervals of CI=95% are approximately the same size or smaller than the
marker shapes and have been omitted for visual clarity.
Table 34. Confusion matrix for device classification of NC=NDevAuth=8 devices us-
ing RF-DNA with MDA/ML to evaluate NTst=4000 testing emissions per device at
SNRA=30 dB.
Declared Class
A
u
th
1
A
u
th
2
A
u
th
3
A
u
th
4
A
u
th
5
A
u
th
6
A
u
th
7
A
u
th
8
Auth1 3688 5 113 55 77 41 7 14
Auth2 34 2769 737 8 2 136 145 169
Auth3 135 707 2790 5 3 117 155 88
Auth4 74 5 10 2609 654 403 36 209
Auth5 90 2 4 707 2885 222 15 75
Auth6 54 159 108 404 255 2225 217 578
Auth7 4 201 112 53 19 243 2837 531
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
Auth8 17 212 95 301 133 591 728 1923
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Figure 33. Device classification performance for NC=NDevAuth=8 devices using RF-
DNA with GRLVQI to evaluate NTst=4000 testing fingerprints per device class.
Confidence intervals of CI=95% are approximately the same size or smaller than the
marker shapes and have been omitted for visual clarity.
Table 35. Confusion matrix for device classification of NC=NDevAuth=8 devices us-
ing RF-DNA with GRLVQI to evaluate NTst=4000 testing emissions per device at
SNRA=30 dB.
Declared Class
A
u
th
1
A
u
th
2
A
u
th
3
A
u
th
4
A
u
th
5
A
u
th
6
A
u
th
7
A
u
th
8
Auth1 3551 29 103 79 126 66 10 36
Auth2 71 2591 801 11 3 117 243 163
Auth3 289 784 2219 8 11 140 308 241
Auth4 194 26 12 2465 747 333 63 160
Auth5 160 2 5 689 2826 162 76 80
Auth6 185 230 183 447 328 1677 311 639
Auth7 6 200 89 35 28 186 2929 527
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
Auth8 97 318 133 354 211 592 1008 1287
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Figure 34. Device classification performance for NC=NDevAuth=8 devices using
matched filtering to evaluate NTst=4000 testing emissions per device class. Confidence
intervals of CI=95% are approximately the same size or smaller than the marker
shapes and have been omitted for visual clarity.
Table 36. Confusion matrix for device classification of NC=NDevAuth=8 devices using
matched filtering to evaluate NTst=4000 testing emissions per device at SNRA=30 dB.
Declared Class
A
u
th
1
A
u
th
2
A
u
th
3
A
u
th
4
A
u
th
5
A
u
th
6
A
u
th
7
A
u
th
8
Auth1 2870 0 0 0 0 1127 3 0
Auth2 177 2385 35 286 834 137 43 103
Auth3 0 1503 1247 0 1250 0 0 0
Auth4 0 878 8 2272 842 0 0 0
Auth5 0 184 1041 285 2490 0 0 0
Auth6 12 59 0 0 488 1728 1585 128
Auth7 546 21 5 0 232 898 1320 978
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
Auth8 66 0 0 0 0 1374 89 2471
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Figure 35. Operation classification performance for NC=NOp=12 operations using RF-
DNA with MDA/ML to evaluate NTst=4000 testing fingerprints per operation class.
Confidence intervals of CI=95% are approximately the same size or smaller than the
marker shapes and have been omitted for visual clarity.
Table 37. Confusion matrix for operation classification of NC=NOp=12 operations
using RF-DNA with MDA/ML to evaluate NTst=4000 testing emissions per operation
at SNRA=30 dB.
Declared Class
A
D
D
.
B
A
D
D
C
.
B
A
N
D
.
B
B
I
C
.
B
B
I
S
.
B
B
I
T
.
B
C
M
P
.
B
D
A
D
D
.
B
M
O
V
.
B
S
U
B
.
B
S
U
B
C
.
B
X
O
R
.
B
ADD.B 263 259 145 481 273 396 528 354 389 207 389 316
ADDC.B 247 239 149 525 317 369 490 381 388 180 397 318
AND.B 199 195 178 513 427 297 494 371 362 171 444 349
BIC.B 100 138 129 643 226 186 625 415 490 114 521 413
BIS.B 216 207 177 494 490 306 485 369 352 171 402 331
BIT.B 225 240 137 531 276 407 499 346 423 185 407 324
CMP.B 96 120 135 613 230 209 638 459 442 109 512 437
DADD.B 113 123 133 625 239 189 667 427 443 103 543 395
MOV.B 108 126 141 634 221 185 674 449 456 123 502 381
SUB.B 237 229 122 448 323 388 511 370 387 215 420 350
SUBC.B 124 145 130 645 226 168 607 422 519 107 525 382
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
XOR.B 113 138 141 625 217 161 650 438 471 112 531 403
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Figure 36. Operation classification performance for NC=NOp=12 operations using RF-
DNA with GRLVQI to evaluate NTst=4000 testing fingerprints per operation class.
Confidence intervals of CI=95% are approximately the same size or smaller than the
marker shapes and have been omitted for visual clarity.
Table 38. Confusion matrix for operation classification of NC=NOp=12 operations
using RF-DNA with GRLVQI to evaluate NTst=4000 testing emissions per operation
at SNRA=30 dB.
Declared Class
A
D
D
.
B
A
D
D
C
.
B
A
N
D
.
B
B
I
C
.
B
B
I
S
.
B
B
I
T
.
B
C
M
P
.
B
D
A
D
D
.
B
M
O
V
.
B
S
U
B
.
B
S
U
B
C
.
B
X
O
R
.
B
ADD.B 616 335 303 110 269 145 320 203 262 368 764 305
ADDC.B 650 291 272 123 286 141 279 219 273 401 749 316
AND.B 674 300 279 105 307 136 317 227 224 332 734 255
BIC.B 604 286 170 159 253 126 384 197 329 407 808 277
BIS.B 680 273 288 108 329 100 321 246 320 388 696 251
BIT.B 601 324 301 123 291 128 352 217 272 363 754 274
CMP.B 568 290 179 146 250 137 377 230 323 410 803 287
DADD.B 594 283 182 145 271 99 377 207 314 447 803 278
MOV.B 585 293 176 120 237 132 392 218 357 362 815 313
SUB.B 651 345 269 131 268 109 397 242 284 366 767 271
SUBC.B 598 291 186 141 279 129 370 218 347 365 766 316
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
XOR.B 577 259 193 145 250 119 401 221 328 380 831 296
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Figure 37. Operation classification performance for NC=NOp=12 operations using
matched filtering to evaluate NTst=4000 testing emissions per operation class. Con-
fidence intervals of CI=95% are approximately the same size or smaller than the
marker shapes and have been omitted for visual clarity.
Table 39. Confusion matrix for operation classification of NC=NOp=12 operations
using matched filtering to evaluate NTst=4000 testing emissions per operation at
SNRA=30 dB.
Declared Class
A
D
D
.
B
A
D
D
C
.
B
A
N
D
.
B
B
I
C
.
B
B
I
S
.
B
B
I
T
.
B
C
M
P
.
B
D
A
D
D
.
B
M
O
V
.
B
S
U
B
.
B
S
U
B
C
.
B
X
O
R
.
B
ADD.B 76 15 12 242 51 33 1438 153 1805 25 131 19
ADDC.B 89 31 28 313 77 32 1783 200 1218 26 184 19
AND.B 93 33 29 322 85 42 1911 226 1018 23 199 19
BIC.B 110 31 25 408 82 42 2184 228 620 30 215 25
BIS.B 76 24 36 299 68 41 1821 190 1214 31 182 18
BIT.B 77 31 22 372 77 34 1901 206 1024 32 198 26
CMP.B 91 24 29 389 87 41 2188 269 619 29 215 19
DADD.B 94 31 20 303 67 36 1783 231 1219 23 175 18
MOV.B 64 22 11 221 50 25 1303 137 2013 10 133 11
SUB.B 95 22 25 312 75 31 1984 199 1012 36 183 26
SUBC.B 98 23 22 362 92 41 2077 232 821 22 195 15
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
XOR.B 93 17 15 314 69 38 1811 201 1209 27 186 20
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Figure 38. Authorized device verification performance for NDevAuth=8 authentic
devices using RF-DNA with MDA/ML. Results obtained from NTst=4000 testing fin-
gerprints per device at SNRA=30 dB. Only one device met the arbitrary benchmark
of EER≤10%, outlined in the top-left corner.
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Figure 39. Rogue device rejection performance for a) RogueA and b) RogueB us-
ing RF-DNA with MDA/ML. Results obtained from NTst=4000 testing fingerprints
per device at SNRA=30 dB. Only three devices met the arbitrary benchmark of
EER≤10%, outlined in the top-left corner, for RogueA and one devices met the
benchmark for RogueB.
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Figure 40. Authorized device verification performance for NDevAuth=8 authentic
devices using RF-DNA with GRLVQI. Results obtained from NTst=4000 testing fin-
gerprints per device at SNRA=30 dB. No devices met the arbitrary benchmark of
EER≤10%, outlined in the top-left corner.
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Figure 41. Rogue device rejection performance for a) RogueA and b) RogueB using
RF-DNA with GRLVQI. Results obtained from NTst=4000 testing fingerprints per de-
vice at SNRA=30 dB. No devices met the arbitrary benchmark of EER≤10%, outlined
in the top-left corner, for either RogueA or RogueB.
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Figure 42. Authorized device verification performance for NDevAuth=8 authentic de-
vices using matched filtering. Results obtained from NTst=4000 testing emissions per
device at SNRA=30 dB. Only one device met the arbitrary benchmark of EER≤10%,
outlined in the top-left corner.
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Figure 43. Rogue device rejection performance for a) RogueA and b) RogueB using
matched filtering. Results obtained from NTst=4000 testing emissions per device at
SNRA=30 dB. Only six devices met the arbitrary benchmark of EER≤10%, outlined
in the top-left corner, for RogueA and three devices met the benchmark for RogueB.
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